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An International Commission of
Inquiry for the South China Sea?:
Defining the Law of Sovereignty
to Determine the Chance for
Peace
Ryan Mitchell*

ABSTRACT

The multilateral territorial dispute over the South China
Sea has intensified in recent years. In response, some observers
endorse the apparent turn to "lawfare"on display in the ongoing
Philippines v. China arbitration,conducted under Annex VII of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Yet the
limited subject matter of this arbitration means that it can
contribute only modestly to any ultimate resolution between
claimants. Indeed, the Chinese side has argued against tribunal
jurisdiction precisely on the basis of the primacy of questions
over territorial sovereignty-which are barred from UNCLOS
proceedings-to the determination of all other legal issues being
contested between the parties.
This Article assesses the merits of these and other major
objections to the UNCLOS arbitration and proposes a
supplemental legal mechanism: an internationalCommission of
Inquiry (COI) by involved states, addressing French, Japanese,
and other extra-regional states' now inactive claims regarding
the sovereign status of the region's various island territories
through the end of World War II hostilities in 1945. Such a COI
would acknowledge, as the UNCLOS arbitrationdoes not, the
centrality of the legal issue of territorial sovereignty to the
dispute. Yet by limiting its findings to the islands' contested
status during the period of European and Japanese colonialism
in Asia, rather than determining current ownership, a COI
could nonetheless avoid exacerbating tensions or alienating
claimants.

* Ph.D. in Law Candidate, Yale University; J.D., Harvard Law School (2012); B.A.,
The New School (2007). Member of the State Bar of California. The author would
especially like to thank Paul Kahn, Robert Post, Scott Shapiro, and David Grewal for
their conversations and insights related to the development of this Article.
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Most importantly, such an approach could serve to
establish a narrowed, but still ample, range of possible legal
claims and outcomes for further adjudication.Claims based on
"discovery" and "conquest" could at least potentially be ruled
out, leaving only "cession"-basedarguments (the implications of
which are considerably less divisive, as they are premised on
mutual recognition between equal states). A COI would also be
based upon and contribute to a regional "epistemic community"
of juridical expertise, furthering transnationalcivil society ties
between claimant states. Finally, the positivistic discourse based
on the principle of legal equality pursued by a COI as here
proposed could, potentially, more generally dissuade unilateral
behavior by individual states, while promoting mutual
recognition and cooperative arrangements among regional
actors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Mhey say that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own. And
therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety [property], there is no
injustice."
- Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (1651)
"[The State of] Qi was once planning an attack on Lu. Lu dispatched Zigong to
dissuade the men of Qi, but they replied: 'Your words are eloquent enough. But
what we want is territory, and that is the one thing you have not mentioned."'
-Han Fei, The Five Vermin, (mid-3rd century B.C.)

There are at present two prevailing and opposing views on the
best means by which the intensifying territorial disputes over the
South China Sea may ultimately be resolved. These are, on one side,
the position of the United States and its regional allies that
sovereignty claims should be shelved in favor of the adjudication 1 of
law of the sea issues under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), usually accompanied by the general directive to
promote peaceful joint development of the territories and to avoid
disruption to a (presumably) non-sovereign status quo. 2 On the other
side is the Chinese position that sovereignty claims-the idea that
some state must own the territory in controversy and that this
question is conceptually antecedent to any generalized international
legal adjudication of rights or duties-should be resolved via bilateral

A helpful introduction to the role of the ongoing Philippines v. China
1.
arbitration in the context of attempts to adjudicate the overall dispute on a
multilateral basis is provided in Robert C. Beckman, The Philippines v. China Case
and the South China Sea Disputes, in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
NAVIGATING ROUGH WATERS (Andrew Billo & Jing Huang eds., 2014).
See, e.g., Michael McDevitt, The South China Sea: Assessing US Policy and
2.
Options for the Future, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES OCCASIONAL PAPER, v-vii (2015)
("The United States takes no position on the relative merits of competing sovereignty
claims" but "does consider establishing rule-based stability in the SCS to be an
important U.S. national interest. This includes a peaceful, non-coercive resolution of
disputes over sovereignty and maritime entitlements."); POWER, LAW, AND MARITIME
ORDER IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 63-71 (Tran Truong Thuy & Le Thuy Trang eds.,
2015) (ebook).
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negotiations between the various parties to the dispute. 3 The two
sides have so far shown scant indication of compromise on this
4
fundamental dissensus.
This Article proposes a third alternative. Because the issue of
territorial sovereignty is, in fact, central to the ultimate disposition of
some legal issues in controversy (and is, as the Chinese side points
out, outside of the scope of UNCLOS), there must be some legal
process for the resolution of this question that is recognized by the
parties to the dispute. At the same time, in order to ensure results
that are viewed as legitimate by all parties, that give an adequate
legal hearing to all relevant claims, and that ultimately promote
peaceful cooperation between regional states and their increasing
integration into a community bound by international law norms,
bilateral negotiations should serve at most a supplementary role to
legal adjudication.
Instead, an approach is called for by means of which the parties
can at least eventually reach a practicable solution to the key issues
in dispute, while agreeing on a set of procedural legal "rules fixed and
announced beforehand ' 5 rather than letting political exigencies or
realpolitik considerations decide the issue of ownership (or, just as
problematically, deciding unilaterally that the sovereignty issue must
be ignored, a position that some see emerging in recent U.S.

3.
See, e.g., THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE
149-52 (Bing Bing Jia & Talmon Stefan eds., 2014); Henry Curtis, Constructing
Cooperation:Chinese Ontological Security Seeking in the South China Sea Dispute, J.
BORDERLANDS STUD., 1-13 (2015).
4.
Use of the word dissensus here to describe the conflict evokes the thought
of Jacques Rancire, who writes that "[d]issensus does not refer to a conflict of
interests, opinions or values, but to the juxtaposition of two forms of the sensory
implementation of collective intelligence." JACQUES RANCIkRE, DISSENSUS: ON
POLITICS AND AESTHETICS 80 (Steve Corcoran ed., trans., 2010). As will be shown in
this Article, the two sides' difference over legal frameworks divides the way that the
dispute can even be initially conceptualized via the deployment of a priori categories;
in other words, the issue in controversy is not only whether or not a law has been
broken but also what set of norms could even be relevant to the parties' claims and
what legal idiom could be used to formulate and communicate those claims. In terms of
the overall structure of UNCLOS and its basic conception of a legal framework for
international waters not commenting upon prior questions of underlying sovereign
ownership, the long-running South China Sea dispute (in part over issues of
ownership) implicates "bow to deal with events that are heterogeneous to the
established order." Id. at 24. A related theoretical conception of how hypostatized "law"
can fail to provide parties with even a mutual vocabulary for communication of
perceived harms or rights is the "differend" as developed in FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE
DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE xi (Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 1988) ("As
distinguished from a litigation, a differend [diffdrend] would be a case of conflict,
between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of
judgment applicable to both arguments."). See Part III, infra, for development of this
point.
5.
Cf. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 110 (1944); see also Joseph
Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 5 (Robert L
Cunningham ed., 1979).
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statements). 6 Assuming that claimants are not likely to simply
abandon all territorial claims sans argument, at stake in finding a
legal means to adjudicate these claims is the question as to whether
such disputes can be "bracketed" within the framework of legal
7
institutions.
Complicating the effort to find such a solution is the fact that
there are two different bodies of "international law" that apply to
various issues under dispute: the law of sovereignty and the law of
the sea.8 Indeed, one virtue claimed for the ongoing UNCLOS
arbitration, Philippines v. China,9 is that it can serve to clarify and
unite on a set of shared bases the positions of all those seeking to
oppose China's "nine-dashed line" (or "U-shaped line") -based
claims. 10 This goal, some assert, can be achieved by using several
relatively well-defined and at least formally agreed-upon principles of
maritime law, such as the size limits of continental shelf-based claims
or Exclusive Economic Zones, to replace messy, volatile, and
unclear arguments over territorial
sometimes conceptually
11
sovereignty. In the words of one advocate of this model of maritime
lawfare,
by emphasizing just the law of the sea in its attempts to promote a peaceful
settlement, Washington can accomplish two objectives: first, it can improve the
relationship of the smaller claimants with each other, paving the way to a more

6.
See, e.g., Ben Blanchard, China Says U.S. Trying to Influence Philippines'
Sea Case, REUTERS (July 24, 2015); see also discussion in Beina Xu, South China Sea
Tensions, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 14 (2014); Brendan Taylor, The South
China Sea Is Not a Flashpoint, 37 WASHINGTON Q. 99 (2014) (discussing the conflict
between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea in 2012).
7.
For a useful overview of reasons for seeking such a framework, see
generally Hayley Roberts, Responses to Sovereign Disputes in the South China Sea, 30
INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 199 (2015); Jonathan G. Odom, How a "Rules-Based
Approach" Could Improve the South China Sea Situation, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA: DIPLOMATIC, LEGAL, AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE DISPUTE-A
REPORT OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Hiebert et al. eds.,

2014).
See, e.g., Mark E. Rosen, Using International Law to Defuse Current
8.
Controversies in the South and East China Seas, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES (2015)
(discussing the survey of UNCLOS and its mechanism for maintaining the public order
of the oceans, the stresses and issues with maintaining public order, and the disputesettlement mechanisms); Sean Mirski, How America Should Wage 'Lawfare' in the
South China Sea, NATIONAL INTEREST (June 4, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/
feature/how-america-should -wage-lawfare-the-south-china-sea- 13040?page=2 [https:/!
perma.cc/89Q4-25CC] (archived Feb. 13, 2016) (discussing sovereignty law under
UNCLOS).
Arbitration between Republic of Philippines v. People's Republic of China,
9.
Permanent Court (Phil. v. China), Arbitration, 2013-19 (Jan. 2013).
A useful overview of the U-shaped line claim is provided in Keyuan Zou,
10.
The Chinese Traditional MaritimeBoundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal
Consequencesfor the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands, INT'L J. MARINE
& COASTAL L. 27, 27 (1999).
See, e.g. Mirski, supra note 8.
11.
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functional coalition against China, and second, it can illegitimate (sic) Beijing's
12
attempt to dominate the entire South China Sea.

Yet, as noted, the South China Sea dispute sits uneasily within
the framework of UNCLOS arbitration. Since the Philippines
launched its case against China in 2013,13 China has adopted a policy
of "no accepting and no participating," due to its view that the
Tribunal has no jurisdiction. 14 In large part, this position is based
precisely on the argument that issues of territorial sovereigntydetermining the legal ownership of specific territories, in this case,
primarily the main island groups of the South China Sea-are both
central to the dispute and outside the scope of UNCLOS. Indeed, the
Tribunal has no power to rule on such questions, and the Philippines
has admitted as much in its own submissions. 15 Nonetheless, it
argued that there are a number of issues in dispute that UNCLOS
can rule on that are separable from the issue of territorial
16
sovereignty.
The Tribunal ruled in November 2015 that it had jurisdiction to
hear some of the Philippines' claims, while acknowledging its
inability to consider the issues of sovereignty that lie outside its
remit. 17 Yet, as will be argued below, this ruling leaves unaddressed,

12.
Id.
13.
A helpful overview of the way that the arbitration is situated in the overall
UNCLOS framework (and arguing that it is the best legal option from the Philippine
perspective) is Emma Kingdon, A Case for Arbitration:The Philippines' Solution for the
South China Sea Dispute, B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 38, 129-159 (2015). The
normative claim advanced by this Article regarding Philippines v. China-that the
sovereignty issues it ignores are central and require some legal consideration-is not
necessarily in tension with views like that advanced by Kingdon. Rather this Article
seeks to acknowledge Chinese critiques based on jurisdiction and other factors, and to
seek a supplemental legal approach that takes account of these varied viewpoints.
14.
Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of
the Philippines (December 7, 2014). Regarding China's "informal" participation in the
dispute by use of such official statement, see, e.g., Mincai Yu, China's Informal
Participationin the Annex vii Philippines v. China Arbitral Tribunal's Proceedings,30
INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 54 (2015).
15.
See Press Release, Arbitration Between the Republic of the Philippines and
the People's Republic of China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague (July 13,
2015) ('The Philippines is not asking the Tribunal to rule on the territorial sovereignty
aspect of its disputes with China.").
16.
For U.S. and European views generally in support of this idea, see MAJOR
LAW AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES (Yann-huei Song & Keyuan Zou eds., 2014).
17.
For a summary, see, e.g., Jay Batongbacal, Implications of the Philippines
v. China Award on Jurisdiction,ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (November
5, 2015), http://amti.csis.org/implications-of-the-philippines-v-china-award-on-jurisdic
tion [https://perma.cc/5CHU-9LNV] (archived Sept. 13, 2016). The Tribunal, in
accepting jurisdiction, "accepted the Philippine formulation that the 15 claims
submitted for judgement only concern the interpretation and application of UNCLOS,
not the sovereignty disputes over the various maritime features dotting the South
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though it may well affect, the underlying basis for the entire dispute
between the parties. This Article seeks both to help clarify the
relative strengths of the Chinese and Philippine arguments on
jurisdiction as well as the potential enforceability and relevance of
the forthcoming judgment on the merits, and to propose an
alternative legal mechanism to resolve at least some of the
fundamental issues left out of the present arbitration. As this Article
18
will argue below, an international Commission of Inquiry (COI)
could be set up collaboratively by claimant states to determine
sovereignty over the disputed territories from France's assertion of its
claims in 1933 through 1945, when Japan (which by then claimed
control over the entirety of the South China Sea) recognized defeat in
the Second World War. As will be explained, a successful and
mutually-recognized determination of this kind would serve to greatly
clarify the legal issues involved in determining present ownership,
and yet permit involved parties to continue pursuing their most
legally persuasive claims. Though only an initial step towards
resolving the question of ownership, a successful COI would deter
extralegal, escalatory behavior by regional powers and promote the
pursuit of recognized ownership in a shared idiom of legal discourse.
Part II of this Article explains the background of and primary
issues in controversy in Philippinesv. China, the rationale behind the
mechanism of UNCLOS arbitration and its role in the present
dispute, and the potential scope of a final ruling on the merits. Part
III addresses the primary arguments against Tribunal jurisdiction
and generally finds that China is right to identify issues of territorial
sovereignty as being at the core of the dispute. At the same time, the
rhetoric of territorial sovereignty as articulated by most claimant
states-frequently described in terms of ancient political or cultural
affiliations that pose heuristic difficulties for modern legal
adjudication 1 9-has up to this point served to intensify nationalistic
tensions and to deter an objective and mutually-recognized legal
determination regarding current ownership.
Part IV proposes a solution to this dilemma by outlining the
structure and function of a potential Commission of Inquiry (COI)
among claimant states to determine the disputed territories'
China Sea, and are therefore subject to arbitration," however, "Beijing's secondary line
of defense-that each measure for relief requested by Manila ultimately requires
maritime delimitation to be carried out before it can be granted-remains to be
considered with the merits of the case." Id.
The presentation of COIs developed in this Article owes much to the very
18.
different (but arguably not irreconcilable) views developed in Larissa J. van den Herik,
An Inquiry into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law: Navigating
the Tensions Between Fact-Findingand Application of International Law, CHINESE J.
INT'L L. (2014), and Adam Ashforth, Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation: On
Commissions of Inquiry as Power/Knowledge Forms, 3 J. HIST. SOC. 1 (1990).
Cf., e.g., Leeanne Sharp, Cognitive Heuristics and Law: An
19.
InterdisciplinaryApproach to Better Judicial Decision-Making, 20 BULL. AUSTL. SOC.
LEG. PHIL. 71 (1995).
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sovereign status through the end of World War II hostilities in 1945.
First, this Article examines the nature and role of such commissions
since their development in The Hague Conventions 20 and the unique
advantages that they enjoy over other international legal
mechanisms. The more particular benefits of a COI in this specific
controversy, especially the refraining of legal discourse away from
historically vague, elastic, nationalistic, and culturally volatile
arguments over "discovery" and towards a more positivistic,
formalized, modern, and Westphalian idiom of clearly documented
legal title, are also explored. The promising recent history of regional
COIs is also analyzed.
Part V places both the problem and proposed solution in the
broader context of key foundational theories of international law, and,
in particular, prominent competing schools of thought regarding the
relative importance of state sovereignty (e.g., territorial sovereignty)
vis-a-vis universal norms and rules (e.g., universal ordering schemes
such as UNCLOS). Liberal, realist, and constructivist positions on
this relationship are compared, and a working rubric of modified
realism is adopted for the purposes of providing an account of the
potential justifications for and function of the COI proposed in this
Article. This Part also seeks to provide an account of the role that
such a COI can play in development of regional cooperation between
competitive, but rational, neighboring powers. Both of these accounts
draw upon the Hobbesian understanding that communally shared
concepts of injustice (and thus legal order) presuppose shared
concepts of property; the Kantian aspiration for a stable order of
peaceful sovereign states; and, finally, the Hegelian insight that
much behavior arises in reaction to and pursuit of various forms of
status recognition. 2 1 Such recognition, in turn, can only be granted by
means of active, participatory legal and political performances
between interacting political equals; issues of territorial sovereignty,
too, should be heard in such forums. 22 This Article argues that, in
place of its current status as one of the region's most intractable

20.
Cf. ALEXANDER PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR:
TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS WITH COMMENTARIES (1909).

21.
Cf. Erik Ringmar, The Relevance of International Law: A Hegelian
Interpretationof a Peculiar Seventeenth-Century Preoccupation,21 REV. INT'L STUD. 87
(1995).
22.
An exploration of this theme in the context of global post-colonial state
independence movements is presented in JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL
POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-COLONIAL NATIONAL IDENTITY, 149-72
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000). As I write below, the South China Sea dispute,
too, ultimately cannot be divorced from its own "post-colonial" historical context.
International legal approaches to resolution of today's disputes should take their
colonial background into account in crafting forums for adjudication of territorial or
related issues.
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geopolitical conflict zones-a site of law's failure-a joint COI could
ultimately turn the South China Sea territorial dispute into an
important regional example of enlightened cooperation and mutual
recognition among equal sovereigns, without the need for
management or intervention by extra-regional powers.

II. PHILIPPINES V. CHINA: BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
A. Summary of the Dispute
Based on both parties' membership in UNCLOS, the Philippines
filed its request under Annex VII of that instrument for a compulsory
arbitration of maritime dispute claims against China on January 22,
2013.23 In the submission containing its Notification and Statement
of the Claim, the Philippines asked the Tribunal (1) to make the
determination that both Chinese and Philippine rights within the
South China Sea are restricted to those defined as part of Territorial
Seas and Contiguous Zones, to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ),
and/or to Continental Shelves; and also (2) to officially declare that
any claims China might make based on its "U-shaped line"
contravene UNCLOS, do not (at least as articulated so far) constitute
a valid legal claim to any of the forms of territorial rights noted
above, and cannot constitute a valid assertion of "historic rights"
within the area delimited by the U-shaped line claim. 24 In addition,
the Philippine side has asked for more specific determinations
supplemental to or derived from the above, which will be detailed
below in Part II.D.
The specific conduct to which the Philippines objects in its
submission consists of both Chinese articulations of maritime claims
and also state activity, such as island reclamation and construction,
undertaken in accordance with those claims. In particular, the
Philippines has objected to alleged Chinese interference with, for
example, fishing rights guaranteed under UNCLOS, as well as to
alleged environmental damage associated with island reclamation
activities, and, most importantly, to what it argues are the
impermissibly broad scale and scope of China's own maritime
territorial claims. 2 5 Ultimately, as noted, much of the Philippines'

See generally Greg Torode, Philippines South China Sea Legal Case
23.
Against China Gathers Pace, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
[https://perma.cc/
articlef2013/09/27/us-china- philippines-idUSBRE98QOBX20130927
3NXT-JUY4] (archived Feb. 15, 2016) (providing basic background of the case's filings).
See Beckman, supra note 1; see also, e.g., Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The
24.
Prospects for the Sino-PhilippineArbitration and the TerritorialDisputes in the South
China Sea, J. E. ASIA & INT'L L. 7, 561, 562 (2014).
25.
See, e.g., Jim Gomez, PhilippinesAsks Tribunal to Invalidate China's Sea
Claims, THE BIG STORY (July 8, 2015), http:/Ibigstory.ap.org/article/e990db61f27
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argumentation centers on the question of the validity and/or
interpretation of China's U-shaped line claim. 26 Though not
requesting that the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal
hearing the dispute rule on the claim itself, which as an issue of
territorial sovereignty is outside of the scope of UNCLOS, the
Philippines has nonetheless brought the U-shaped line under judicial
scrutiny by asking the Tribunal to rule on the maximum possible
27
scope of rights the claim could or could not convey under the treaty.
Chinese objections to the litigation focused on precisely this
point. Given that issues of sovereignty are not covered by UNCLOS,
the Chinese side holds that the Philippines v. China arbitration
impermissibly introduces such issues into the forum. Though this
essentially jurisdictional point of controversy is analyzed in more
detail in Part III.A., infra, it is important to note that in its own
statement of its claims the Philippines acknowledges the contention
that sovereignty claims are barred under UNCLOS. 28 Indeed, the
Philippines
also
explicitly
acknowledges
another
Chinese
jurisdictional objection, based in the latter's 1996 official declaration
under Article 298 of the treaty that it does not accept provisions for
binding dispute resolution under UNCLOS Part XV insofar as they
relate to, inter alia, sea boundary delimitations or so-called "historic
rights."2 9 Both acknowledgments by the Philippines, in fact, play an
important role in its own articulation of its legal claims, as these are
crafted in the attempt to avoid the appearance of addressing this
30
potentially precluded subject matter.
China has not made an official appearance in the arbitration,
opting instead to make its jurisdictional objections known via public
statements. 31 Instead, it has reiterated its jurisdictional and other
related objections to the case via official statements by its Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, with the understanding that these statements will be
taken into account by the PCA panel currently considering the

84e9c8c4c47 1fbf8f978b/philippines -asks-tribunal- invalidate -chinas -sea-claims [https://
perma.cc/5KUB-TU9D] (archived Feb. 15, 2016) (providing a Philippine perspective on
the scope and nature of China's sea claims).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
See Press Release, supra note 15.
29.
Id.; see also THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION, supra note 3.
30.
See, e.g., Sean Mirski, Should the Philippines' South China Sea Case
Against China Proceed?: China Argues It Should Not, On Jurisdictional Grounds,
DIPLOMAT (Aug. 21, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/O8/should-the-philippinesssouth-china-sea-case-against-china-proceed/ [https://perma.cc/GQSD-CD7A] (archived
Apr. 1, 2016).
31.
See Lan Nguyen, South China Sea: Philippines v. China: Legal Questions
Regarding China's Non-Participation in the Philippines v. China Arbitration,
DIPLOMAT (July 27, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/south-china-sea -philippinesv-china/ [https://perma.cc/B9U7-JV9T] (archived Apr. 1, 2016) (explaining China's
choice to use a "position paper" to advance its jurisdictional argument).
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jurisdictional question. 32 Indeed, this is a relatively common
procedure in arbitrations where one party does not appear, and
arbitrators are generally expected to make every effort to consider the
possible arguments that would be raised by the non-appearing
party. 33 Following initial written submissions and oral hearings at
The Hague in July 2015, the Tribunal decided on the issue of
jurisdiction in November 2015, finding that it could hear most of the
Philippines' claims and that these did not necessarily require a ruling
on the underlying question of sovereign ownership. 34 On the other
hand, however, the Tribunal noted that its ability to address the
merits of many of the Philippines' claims would rely on that party's
assertion that "no maritime feature in the South China Sea generates
more than a 12 nautical mile territorial sea." In other words, as the
Tribunal explained, "if (contrary to the Philippines' position) any
maritime feature in the Spratly Islands constitutes an "island" within
the meaning of Article 121 . . .the Tribunal may not be able to reach
35
the merits of certain of the Philippines' Submissions."

B. The Structure and Purpose of UNCLOS Arbitration
Annex VII of UNCLOS provides for the establishment of an
arbitral tribunal to hear disputes between treaty members, barring
two states parties' agreement to one of the alternative mechanisms
specified under the treaty. 36 These alternatives are (1) adjudication
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), (2)
adjudication before the International Court of Justice, or (3)
adjudication by means of a special arbitration tribunal established
via UNCLOS's Annex VIII (and requiring the UN Secretary General
to act in a judicial appointment capacity). 37 In this case, neither of

Id.
32.
Id.
33.
34.
Shannon Tiezzi, China: Court Ruling on South China Sea Case 'Null and
Void', DIPLOMAT (Oct. 31, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/1O/china-court-ruling-onsouth-china- sea-case-null-and-void] [https://perma.cc/3BJ4-L6NU] (archived Apr. 1,
2016).
35.
Philippines/China Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Oct. 29, 2015)
http://www.pcacases.com [https:lperma.cc/G7M7-MHTZ I (archived Apr. 21, 2016).
See, e.g., Kingdon, supra note 13, at 141-47, whose excellent summary
36.
forms the basis for the account provided in this section. The available mechanisms
have been criticized as failing to offer states attractive options for the effective or
predictable resolution of disputes, as well as requiring them to sacrifice control (or
rights of withdrawal) that might be able to entice greater cooperation and integration
within the overall regime. See, e.g., Natalie Klein, The Effectiveness of the UNCLOS
Dispute Settlement Regime: Reaching for the Stars?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING (AMER. SOC. OF INT'L LAw) 108, 359-64 (2015).
37.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], http://www.un.org/deptslos/conventionagreementstexts/unclos/unclose.pdf [https://perma.cc/26ZT-T2L5] (archived Apr. 1,
2016); Kingdon, supra note 13, at 141-42.
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the two states involved in the dispute indicated, during the course of
the present matter or at any time previously, that they preferred any
of the alternative forums offered under the treaty. 3 8 By default, the
case has thus proceeded via Annex VII's option for an "ad hoc
arbitration panel"; though, as noted, China has indicated that it
views its prior declarations of reservation to UNCLOS's arbitration'
provisions (as well as the treaty text) as precluding the subject matter
of the present dispute.
The potential scope of subject matter for arbitration under
UNCLOS is, indeed, highly circumscribed. Acceptable claims must
center on the specific provisions of the treaty, which, despite its
considerable importance and influence as a "constitution of the
oceans," 39 nonetheless covers only issues related to the definition,
uses, rights, and obligations attached to states in connection with
international waters. Under the treaty, all maritime claims must be
based on either baselines generated by land territory, or fall into a
restricted category of "historic rights" based on long-running
customary use of a body of water, with the assent of other states, in
40
general contravention of the rights otherwise applicable.
More specifically, the treaty establishes a set of legallydetermined maritime zones in which states can legitimately claim
varying political and economic rights. Most robust are "territorial
sea" zones, which must extend no more than twelve nautical miles
from the land territory of the state in question and which confer on
the possessing state full sovereignty equivalent to that enjoyed on
land. 4 1 The political and economic rights of that sovereign ownership
apply to the ocean floor, subsoil, water, and airspace, and cover the
ability to exclude non-nationals from entering these spaces. 42 States
may also enjoy such rights within the boundaries of their
"Continental Shelf' as defined in UNCLOS Part VI, which comprises
"the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
[the state's] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its
43
land territory," up to 200 nautical miles from a territorial baseline.
Continental shelf determinations are based on factors such as
elevation, slope, and geological composition of the claimed territory.

38.

Kingdon, supra note 13, at 145.

39.
See, e.g., Stephanie Holmes, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in
Arctic Sovereignty, 9 CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 323, 330-31 (2008).
40.
See generally Florian Dupuy & Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Legal Analysis of
'China's HistoricRights Claim in the South China Sea, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (2013)
(providing a legal analysis of China's historic rights claim in the South China Sea); Zou
Keyuan, HistoricRights in InternationalLaw and in China's Practice,32 OCEAN DEV.
& INT'L L. 149 (2001) (providing an overview of historic rights in international law).
41.
UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 2.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. art. 57
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In addition to the "full sovereign" rights accorded to states
within their territorial sea or Continental Shelf claims, states under
UNCLOS are also accorded Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which
bundle exclusive rights related to exploration and economic
exploitation of all resources within the space so delimited. 44 EEZs
45
may extend up to 200 nautical miles from a territorial baseline.
Within its EEZ, moreover, a state may engage in various forms of
activity not strictly limited to narrowly-defined "economic" behavior,
including the construction and operation of artificial structures,
permanent maritime bases, island reclamation or the construction of
artificial islands, and the like. 4 6 Other states may be precluded from
engaging in such activities within the EEZ zone, though states are
obliged to recognize rights to peaceful and unmolested transit by all
others.
Finally, specific rights attach to various categories of offshore
geological features, which vary greatly depending on the size,
habitability, and other characteristics of claimed territory so-defined.
Within the parameters of UNCLOS, features claimed by states may
fall into the general categories of islands, rocks, low tide elevations,
or artificial islands-the distinctions among which are at least
partially (but not exhaustively) defined by the treaty. 47 These
categorical distinctions can have quite dramatic implications, as of
the four categories "islands" form baselines generating all of the
maritime zones that characterize land territory; twelve nautical miles
of territorial sea, 200 nautical miles of EEZ, and any potential
Continental Shelf claims. 48 "Islands" are defined (with problematic
vagueness) as naturally formed areas of land, remaining above water
at high tide, which are capable of sustaining human habitation or
49
economic life.
"Rocks," by contrast, are also areas of land that remain above sea
level at high tide, yet which "cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life" on their own, and which grant twelve nautical miles of
territorial sea without conferring the EEZ or Continental Shelf rights
associated with islands. 50 This island/rock distinction, introduced in
UNCLOS Article 121, has generated a substantial literature
regarding its vagueness, potential conflicting interpretations of such
factors as "sustaining human habitation," and also the tactical
political maneuvering by states parties that led to the form taken by

44.

Id. art. 121.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. art. 57
Id. art. 57, 60.
See id. art.12, 121(1-2).
Id. art. 3, 121(2).
Id. art. 121(1-2).
Id. art. 3, 121(1, 3).
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these clauses. 51 Indeed, no all-purpose metric for making this
distinction has yet been developed, complicating efforts to resolve
52
territorial disputes under these categories.
"Low tide elevations," which are areas of land that are
submerged under water at high tide but exposed at low tide, are
capable of extending a state's territorial sea only if they are located
within that zone as otherwise defined. 53 They cannot, however,
themselves act as baselines to generate territorial seas, EEZs, or
other rights. "Artificial islands," finally, are constructed features not
naturally formed and are accorded no rights in and of themselves
54
aside from a 500-meter safety zone.
As noted, UNCLOS provides a set of definitions for each of these
categories, but these have been criticized as lacking in precision and
susceptible to multiple competing interpretations. 55 Perhaps most
importantly, the island/rock distinction leaves in doubt the exact
method of ascertaining the question of "habitability," with the result
that any state believing itself to be in possession of a given maritime
feature is incentivized to attempt to characterize it as an "island,"
while states opposing such claims may develop various lines of
56
argumentation for why the feature should be considered a "rock."
The above legal issues all play a role in the current dispute over
South China Sea maritime claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, but even if fully determined by
the Tribunal, would not suffice to resolve the underlying controversy.
Because it is generally accepted that at least some features within
the contested area are fully qualified as "islands," the actual
ownership of these areas of land must be determined before any final
boundary determinations could be assigned to particular states.
Indeed, even if some or all of the features in dispute were to be
defined as "rocks," these would still convey twelve-mile territorial sea
zones to the power successfully claiming legal title to them. UNCLOS,
for its part, does not cover the issue of territorial ownership over
islands, rocks, or any other feature: it applies only to the question of

51.
On the political context in which the distinction was made, and an analysis
of its problematic vagueness, see James Crawford, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 262-65 (2012).
52.
Id.; see also Marius Gjetnes, The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?, 32
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 191, 192 (2001). For examples of decisions applying the rule,
see, e.g., Nicaragua v. Honduras (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports (2007);
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports (2008).
UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 13.
53.
Id. art. 60.
54.
55.
See, e.g., Tommy Koh, Mapping out Rival Claims in the South China Sea,
STRAITS TIMES (2011) (summarizing the multiple interpretations of the UNCLOS
definitions).
56.
See id. ('"They seem to be saying that 'my rock is an island and your island
is only a rock"').
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how maritime boundaries may be delimited after such ownership
57
determinations have been settled.
C. Facts Underlying (and Complicating)the Dispute
The basic geopolitical facts underlying the controversy

are, on

the one hand, very explicit-they have to do with the movements of
58
within various parts of the
vessels, people, resources, and land

South China Sea, as well as the justifications for or complaints
against such movements by the various states involved in the region,

and on the other hand, quite dynamic and complex. Since global news
media began to increasingly fixate on the region as a potential
military flashpoint, updates and information about state behavior or
official statements have been broadcast worldwide in a constant
stream, generating a vast body of governmental, journalistic,
academic, and other forms of discourse and commentary. New events
are regularly generated due to the extreme economic importance of
this maritime area for global commerce, with roughly $5.3 trillion of
59
trade making use of its sea lanes, as well as the ongoing processes
of economic and military expansion and development by regional

powers,

60

and more specifically the decades of generally intensifying

efforts by states to bolster their claims via competing military or civil
61

occupations and development of claimed features.
The involvement of U.S. naval forces in the region, as well as the

complex alliances or hostilities resulting from the legacies of World
War II and Cold War frameworks of international relations, further
complicate the interactions of regional states. 62 Indeed, today
territorial disputes in the South China Sea have become a source of
intense international concern, and of often escalating confrontational

57.
See generally Klein, supra note 36 (assessing the effectiveness of the
UNCLOS dispute settlement regime).
58.
Given the artificial island construction and land reclamation activities by a
number of states in the region, the "movement of land" is applicable both figuratively,
in terms of the assignation of rights to territory between different states, and literally,
as in the actual act of moving land from one place to another or creating it from
dredged soil.
59.
For a highly readable account of the region's economic, political, and
diplomatic dynamism, see ROBERT D. KAPLAN, ASIA'S CAULDRON: THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA AND THE END OFA STABLE PACIFIC (2014).
60.
See generally id. The South China Sea claimant states represent some of
the world's fastest growing and largest economies.
61.
See, e.g., Edward Wong, Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010), http:/www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24
navy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NJE8-FX7C] (archived Apr. 4, 2016).
Thomas J. Christensen, China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the
62.
See, e.g.,
Security Dilemma in East Asia, 23 INT'L SECURITY 49, 67-69 (1999) (discussing the
precautionary and defensively motivated measures taken in East Asia and their
potential issues).
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rhetoric by involved parties. 63 In particular, the area has turned into
the key space in which it has become possible-even increasingly
common-for Western expert analysts and news media to imagine
military conflict between an increasingly "belligerent" China and a
United States determined to maintain the "status quo," even by arms
64
if necessary.
Physical occupation of disputed territories and the forcible
exclusion or expulsion of other claimants is, without doubt, the single
most volatile form of behavior undertaken by claimant states. Modern
geopolitical wrangling over the region, in fact, began in large part
with France's occupation of the Paracel and Spratly Island chains of
the South China Sea in 1933, when it unilaterally declared its
"discovery" and occupation of these island territories as terra
nullius-eliciting protests from both Chinese and Japanese
authorities who claimed prior "discovery" and occupation. 65 By 1939,
a militant Japan had seized all of the South China Sea's major
islands, including those occupied by France, and asserted its own
occupation in keeping with its earlier claim, only to renounce the
territories in the 1951-1952 peace treaties ending World War II
hostilities. 66 In the postwar period, Vietnam, the Philippines, China,
and Taiwan have all occupied various marine features, and indeed
each continues to do so. 6 7 Likewise, associated activities such as
naval patrols, construction of improvements or artificial features,
declarations of airspace restrictions, harassment of foreign states'
fishing vessels or transiting civilians, and various forms of symbolic
assertions of ownership or control have all served to intensify
68
interstate conflicts or inflame nationalist passions.
This intensity of emotional attachment and subsequent
escalation of aggressive rhetoric, while much noticed by non-regional
observers, is seldom put into its historical context. A full review of the
various social and cultural meanings associated with the South China
Sea for all, or any, of the different state claimants would be a project
of such range and scale that it must fall well outside of the scope of
this Article. Yet the first relevant point to be made in the context of
the argument advanced here is that, for most of the many millennia

63.
See, e.g., id. at 69-70.
64.
See, e.g., Senators Seek US Strategy to Stop China's Maritime
Reclamations, VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 19, 2015) (reporting on the U.S. Senate's response to
China's artificial island projects).
65.
See Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who's on First, INT'L
BOUNDARIES RESEARCH UNIT 7-22 (1996).
66.
Id. at 15.
67.
Id.
68.
See, e.g., Beckman, supra note 1; Q&A: South China Sea Dispute, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.hbc.com/news/world -asia -pacific-13748349 [https://
perma.ccN8U9-VLN7] (archived Apr. 4, 2016) (summarizing the ongoing Philippinesv.
China case).
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of the South China Sea's presence in the consciousness of regional
civilizations, it was conceived in terms of various forms of affiliation
or control that do not translate smoothly into the modern juridical
69
idiom of Westphalian territorial sovereignty.
One example of such non-Westphalian conceptions persisting
until a strikingly modern date can be seen in lines written by the
expatriate loyalist Chinese author and poet Yu Dafu in 1942 about
his experiences fleeing British colonial Singapore in advance of the
Japanese invasion. 70 Looking back on his recent home, he wrote:
"Again, a famous city has become a war zone; / a mound of unhatched
71
eggs, our Southern Borderlands risk being smashed to pieces."
Here, as elsewhere, Yu managed to insightfully convey key elements
of his cultural milieu. While the term he used for the "Southern
Borderlands," nan jiang (Mj

), 72 was in fairly common use at the

time to denote China's often unspecified territorial claims and
affiliations in the South China Sea, Singapore per se had never been
part of the territory of any Chinese state. Nonetheless, as part of the
general "South Sea" territory it could easily be imagined within the
general scope of nan jiang,73 making especially explicit the expansive
sensibility associated with such claims in the popular Chinese social
imaginary 74 of the time. As the rising and falling dynasties of the
Chinese polity had effectively "revealed" new national territory
through a slow but inexorable process of organic expansion, so too

Cf. CASTELLINO, supra note 22.
69.
See YU DAFU, MISCELLANEOUS POEMS OF CHAOS AND SEPARATION (ALtjk
70.
1, 33 (1978)).
4) (1942) (cited in Xin Wenxue Shiliao (O:C -0)
71.
Id.
72.
See, e.g., S. FREDERICK STARR, XINJIANG: CHINA'S MUSLIM BORDERLAND 63
(2004). The word "borderland" or jiang (?A) here indicates both the vague extent and
the military/security associations of China's great territorial claim to the south. In
these respects, it closely resembles the contemporary claim to China's territory in
"New Borderland", which today is treated as a
Turkic Central Asia, Xinjiang (,ir),
"core interest" of inalienable Chinese sovereignty and is basically uncontested by other
states.
73.
It is important to note here that this overreach of popular conceptions of
the idea of nan jiang does not itself detract from the legal validity of any individual
territorial claims that might be associated with the notion. This is both because actual
official state proclamations tended to be far more specific, including geographical data,
maps, and other such details, and because the question of the legal status of any
particular piece of territory depends on the legal validity and exact definition of a
state's claims to that particularpiece of territory. Thus, the fact that modern China
and Taiwan do not lay claim to sovereignty over Singapore does not, itself, affect the
legal status of any other territory that has been associated with nan jiang. The vague
scope of the popular conception is introduced here to indicate the deep historicocultural resonance of the South China Sea in Chinese national sentiment (in a way
paralleled by other claimant states).
See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 171-76 (2007) (exploring the
74.
role of the 'social imaginary' in defining the extent of national membership and the
boundaries of the polity); cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1982).
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could the colonial outposts of other powers eventually return to the
75
ambit of Chinese rule.
As Bill Hayton has written in a valuable overview of the deep
historical origins of the South China Sea dispute and their
implications for present day controversies, the various states,
empires, and civilizations that populated the area did not define their
claims in Western legal terms; rather, "it was a polyglot place of
exchange and trade where questions of sovereignty were utterly
different from the way they are posed today." 7 6 Yet while this
epistemic difference may justify the assertion that "[i]n no sense did
any state or people 'own the Sea,"' 7 7 today's states fully recognize that
their prior claims were not articulated in the modern Westphalian
legal idiom, while nonetheless asserting that they may as
autonomous sovereigns translatetheir previous territorial claims into
the rights and obligations afforded by modern sovereignty. 78 As the
example of nan jiang demonstrates, territorial affiliations once
expressed in non-Western terms can certainly inform modern political
claims. However, it is not even remotely feasible to seek to deny these
sovereign states the right to pursue such claims, as some
commentators suggest. As a purely normative matter, it may be
reasonable to assert that the South China Sea's "future should be a
global concern." 79 Yet as an issue of international law, there are no
available means by which a state may be compelled to refrain from
claiming legal ownership of a given territory and seeking fair
adjudication of such claims.8 0 Nor is it at all clear there should be in
this case.
Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei,
the South China Sea claimant states, have all articulated their

75.
See, e.g., Andrew Coleman & Jackson Maogoto, 'Westphalian' Meets
'Eastphalian'Sovereignty: China in a Globalized World, 3 ASIAN J. INT'L L. 237, 249-55
(2013) (discussing the broad extent of traditional Chinese conceptions of imperial
"sovereign" territory, covering under the territorial claim of Tianxia (9 IF)or "All
Under Heaven" most of what we now think of as "Asia").
76.
See BILL HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN
ASIA 27 (2014).
77.
Id.
78.
See Adam Bray, The Cham: Descendants of Ancient Rulers of South China
Sea Watch Maritime Dispute from Sidelines, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (June 18,
2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/06/140616-south-china-sea-vietn
am-china-cambodia-champa/ [https://perma.cc/FJN4-J78C] (archived Apr. 4, 2016);
John Chaffee, Cultural Transmission by Sea: Maritime 41 Trade Routes in Yuan
China, in EURASIAN INFLUENCES ON YUAN CHINA 51 (Morris Rossabi ed., 2013).
Despite Hayton's claim that no state or people ever "owned" the territories of the South
China Sea, however, states did at least assert ownership in various ways, and both
China and Vietnam, for example, acted in and spoke about the region in ways that give
them colorable claims to legal ownership starting before the twentieth century.
79.
See HAYTON, supra note 76, at xvii (explaining the globalized nature of the
South China Sea's history).
80.
See Beckman, supra note 1, at 54.
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respective legal claims to South China Sea territory in the idiom of
modern legal sovereignty. That they are able to do so, as autonomous
sovereign states taken to be equals by the rest of the international
community, is in each case the result of decades of anti-colonial
struggle and the pursuit of legal and political recognition. 8 1 As will be
developed further below, the key challenge of resolving the South
China Sea dispute is to balance these states' lawful enjoyment of
Westphalian sovereign rights equal to those of any other member of
the international community with the separate geopolitical goal of
promoting regional peace and integration, as well as the continued
socialization of regional powers into international law norms and
processes. Each of today's claimant states suffered to various degrees
under colonialism until the mid-twentieth century and watched
French and then Japanese troops seize the islands of the South China
82
Sea in total disregard of preexisting political claims and affiliations.
None has welcomed the idea of abandoning its own hard-won claims
to ownership without a legal hearing. The question, then, is how
international law can provide a forum for such claims to prevent
them being settled as a matter of mere realpolitik. Due to its limited
focus, Philippinesv. China provides no such possibility.
D. Potential Scope of a Final Ruling
In its submissions to the Tribunal, 83 the Philippine side has
argued (1) that China cannot claim "historic rights" in the region
different from the rights conferred under the UNCLOS regime as part
of an appropriate EEZ; (2) that the U-shaped line claim is
impermissibly large and is not based on appropriate territorial
baselines; (3) that at least some of the maritime features that China
claims as islands conferring territorial claims are, under UNCLOS,
not definable as such but rather are definable merely as "rocks" that
do not generate territorial ownership; (4) that China has interfered
with Philippine's enjoyment of rights, such as fishing within the
Philippine EEZ, that are protected under UNCLOS; and (5) that
China's artificial island construction, fishing, and harvesting
activities are damaging the local natural environment in
84
contravention of UNCLOS obligations.

For various perspectives on this colonial history, see, e.g., KAPLAN, supra
81.
note 59; Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination:A TerritorialInterpretation,
16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); and Craig Reynolds, Self-Cultivation and SelfDetermination in Postcolonial Southeast Asia, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES:
REORIENTATIONS 7-35 (1998).

82.
83.
84.

See Dzurek, supra note 65, at 9.
Press Release, supra note 15.
See id. at 3.
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A final ruling would, thus, potentially address the proper scope
and method of analysis of pre-UNCLOS territorial claims to large sea
territories, a question that could have broad precedential relevance to
other disputes, as well as similarly impactful legal issues including a
more specific delimitation of the island/rock distinction, and the way
that maritime territorial claims predating UNCLOS should be
interpreted and adjudicated under its arbitration regime. 85 With
regards to the present controversy, a number of claims related to
territorial sovereignty or exclusive rights would likely be either
eliminated or modified based on ultimate disposition on the legal
questions raised in the Philippine submission. In particular, regional
powers, particularly China and Vietnam, could find it much more
difficult to make arguments for EEZ-like zones based on historic
rights. 86 Meanwhile, greater specification of the island-rock
distinction could limit any potential territorial claims, made by any
party. Most dramatic would be a definitive ruling (which the
Philippines has requested) that certain features are not islands
affording territorial rights; any decision to this effect by the Tribunal
would both seriously compromise particular states' efforts to assert
sovereignty over such features and, in all likelihood, raise questions
as to the degree to which the UNCLOS Tribunal has actually taken
into account sufficient evidence regarding such difficult key
determinations as "habitability." The island of Itu Aba, in particular,
(the largest feature in the Spratly chain, currently claimed by both
Taiwan and China and occupied by the former since the 1950s) would
afford a full 200 nautical mile EEZ and accompanying rights if it were
found to be an "island" under UNCLOS. The Philippine request that
the Tribunal rule that Itu Aba is not an "island" is viewed with
particular concern and opposition by both Taiwan and China. As I
have argued elsewhere, the understandable perception by both these
claimants that the Philippines is using the UNCLOS arbitration as a
"back door" to eliminate even the possibility of having sovereign
ownership claims adjudicated (by seeking a ruling classifying the
territories as "rocks" not subject to sovereignty claims) risks
exacerbating the overall dispute in the direction of further
87
politicization and militarization.
At the same time, the ruling would leave undecided questions as
to the actual ownership of any specific territories in dispute, at least
with regards to any maritime features found to be "islands" under

85.
See id. at 5.
86.
Cf. Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40, at 140-41 (indicating one potential
approach that the Philippines v. China Tribunal or future arbitrators could take to the
historic rights issue).
87.
Ryan Mitchell, Why Taiwan and China Agree on South China Sea
Sovereignty, THE DIPLOMAT, (March 29, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/whytaiwan-and-china-agree-on- south -china- sea-sovereignty/ [https://perma.ec/N6CF-WVW
S] (archived May 7, 2016).
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UNCLOS definitions, along with their surrounding waters. Moreover,
and most significantly for the argument advanced in this Article, the
UNCLOS Tribunal would leave undecided the proper method and
forum for determining territorial sovereignty over the contested area.
As noted, the major claimants each advance a number of alternative
legal arguments, with possible claims based on either ancient
presence and political administration, historical declarations of
ownership and occupation, "discovery" at some specific point in time
(ancient or modern) as terra nullius, or formal obtainment of
sovereignty based on state succession, annexation, or legal transfer
by mutual agreement between states.
Of course, even a highly equitable ruling concerning the precise
geographical delimitation of hypothetical marine boundaries
stemming from unassigned island territories would be of limited
utility if, for example, war were to subsequently break out to
determine who actually owns the islands. As the following Part (III)
will argue, three main problems impede the prospects for the
Philippines v. China arbitration to serve as a viable means of
resolving the ultimate dispute between various South China Sea
claimants, in particular but not limited to the specific parties to that
arbitration. These are (1) the number, scope, and importance of
unresolved territorial ownership questions necessarily left outside of
the arbitration but very much at the center of the underlying
geopolitical controversy; (2) the vast historical and geographic scale
and extreme heuristic difficulty of ascertaining which ownership
claims might be temporally prior and legally sufficient; and (3) the
pernicious, and escalating, effects of sovereignty claims framed
within the categories afforded by the international law concept of
"discovery," which permit exceedingly elastic criteria for the
introduction of politically incendiary historical evidence, national
narratives, and state behavior, and, relatedly, fail to supply legally
exact criteria for the determination of territorial ownership.

III. THE DISSENSUS OVER UNCLOS: THE LAW OF THE SEA VERSUS THE
LAW OF SOVEREIGNTY

A. Evaluating Chinese JurisdictionalObjections and Philippine
Responses
In the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs' December 2014 Position
Paper 88 regarding Philippines v. China, four key positions were
advanced that, separately and together, seek to argue against
Tribunal jurisdiction. These are (1) that the "essence of the subject-

88.

Position Paper, supra note 14.
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matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over several
maritime features in the South China Sea," and that the issue of
territorial sovereignty neither lies within the scope of UNCLOS nor is
related to its interpretation or application; (2) that previous bilateral
agreements between China and the Philippines, as well as the
ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea, have established a mutual obligation to pursue dispute
settlement via bilateral negotiations; (3) that even if the subjectmatter of Philippines v. China were otherwise acceptable for
UNCLOS arbitration, China's 2006 declaration of reservation from
compulsory arbitration procedures over, inter alia, maritime
delimitation issues, excuse China's abstention from the proceedings;
and (4) that based on the above and "by virtue of the freedom of every
State to choose the means of dispute settlement, China's rejection of
and non-participation in the present arbitration stand on solid
89
ground in international law."
Of the above objections, the greatest degree of legal and logical
force attaches to the first, which characterizes the arbitration as an
attempt to indirectly adjudicate issues of territorial sovereignty
prohibited under UNCLOS arbitration. Issues of territorial
sovereignty are indeed clearly prohibited from decision by arbitration
under UNCLOS. 9 0 No attempt has been made by the Philippine side
to argue that the case should still go forward should the Tribunal find
that sovereignty must first be determined before other issues can be
adjudicated. Indeed, in the Philippine Foreign Secretary's Opening
Statement during Tribunal hearings at The Hague in July 2015, he
reiterated that, "in submitting this case, the Philippines is NOT
asking the Tribunal to rule on the territorial sovereignty aspect of its
91
disputes with China."
The Philippines has responded to this objection that, even if
China is assumed arguendo to have territorial sovereignty over the
maximum extent of its allowable claims under UNCLOS, its current
articulation of those claims and various activities conducted in
pursuance of the claims will still be found to be in violation of its
treaty obligations. 9 2 More specifically, as noted, the Philippine side
has advanced arguments against (1) China's enjoyment of any
"historic rights" in the region different from UNCLOS EEZ rights; (2)

89.

Id.

90.
See MIGUEL GARcIA GARCIA-REVILLO, THE CONTENTIOUS AND ADVISORY
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 90-91 (2015)

(presenting a more nuanced view of this excluded subject matter in relation to
UNCLOS).

91.

Paterno Esmaquel II, EXPLAINER: Philippines' 5 Arguments vs China,

RAPPLER (July 9, 2015, 1:54 PM), http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/98839-philippi
nes-china-hague-arguments -explanation [https:Hlperma.cc/27JL-U2WN] (archived Mar.
3, 2016).
92.
See id.; see also Mirski, supra note 30.

20161

DEFINING THE LAW OF SOVEREIGNTY

China's U-shaped line claim as being incompatible with UNCLOS
maritime delimitations; (3) the question as to whether certain
maritime features claimed by China as "islands" are instead mere
"rocks" without territorial relevance; (4) alleged Chinese interference
with Philippine EEZ rights; and (5) alleged harm to the regional
environment arising from Chinese administrative and economic
93
activities.
The United States, notably, has supported the Philippines'
contention that at least some of these issues are separable from the
question of territorial sovereignty. 94 Indeed, the U.S. State
Department has now formally stated that
unless China clarifies that the dashed-line claim reflects only a claim to islands
within that line and any maritime zones that are generated from those land
features in accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the
LOS Convention, its dashed-line claim does not accord with the international
95
law of the sea.

In the same report, the United States made clear its position that
China has not demonstrated, nor could it, historic rights to all of the
territories it claims in the South China Sea. 9 6 In both the U.S.
Department of State report and the Philippine submission (as well as
in other statements by the two governments and those who agree
with them), the law of the sea is argued to effectively constrain
sovereignty claims, not just as a hypothetical matter, but also as a
source of prior determinations potentially giving rise to binding
97
judicial rulings.
Is this position tenable, either as a matter of international legal
doctrine or as a viable politico-juridical approach to resolving the
dispute? In order to meet both standards of evaluation, the U.S.Philippine argument would have to satisfy at least three criteria: (1)
does it accurately reflect existing legal doctrine as applicable to this
matter?; (2) does it provide the parties with a fair hearing respecting
all of their rights and obligations under international law, including
but not limited to those created by UNCLOS?; and (3) does it promote
peaceful and fair resolution of the underlying geopolitical
controversy?
While these three criteria could be evaluated separately, they are
in fact so closely linked together that it is most effective to analyze
them in tandem, working backward from general to specific
considerations. Beginning with the final criterion, it is necessary to

93.

Esmaquel II, supra note 91.

94.

See OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS No. 143:

MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

95.
96.
97.

Id.
See id. at 23.
See id. at 14.

24 (2014).

CHINA,
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view the particular Philippine-Chinese controversy in its contexts
both as part of the overall contestation between all South China Sea
claimants and as a representative instance of issues that frequently
appear in international legal controversies. Political solutions that
focus on particular details while ignoring their representative and
recurring character are unlikely to foster long-term improvement.
Here, the Philippines v. China arbitration can be justified if it tends
to keep the individual parties, and other similarly situated states,
engaged in the international system and in dialogue over shared
"transnational legal processes" 9 8 that they view as legitimate and
fair.
The third criterion, thus, depends upon the second. Although a
fair and effective final resolution of all states' claims would be the
ideal outcome, more important are states' perceptions of the fairness
and legal validity of the processes in which they are mutually
engaged. An adequate approach could simply be one resulting in
states' resolution to continue engaging by means of the institutions of
international law, refraining from militarized or escalatory behavior,
and continuing to participate in and be "socialized" by the norms and
processes of the present international order. 99 This, in fact, is the
ultimate justification for the Philippine-U.S. advocacy of UNCLOS
arbitration: by unifying all claimant states within a shared and
limited set of possibly valid territorial and behavioral boundaries, it
would promote engagement in mutually legitimated legal
processes. 100

This argument, however, relies in turn upon the proposition that
all claimant states would in fact view the resulting process as
legitimate and as providing them with a fair hearing as to their most
important claims. As China has already pointed out in its official
statements, it does not so view the UNCLOS arbitration. 10 1 This
objection, is often interpreted by foreign observers in a reductive
fashion, as no more than the self-interested protest of an acquisitive
state. 10 2 Yet, in fact, this particular difference of opinion goes to more
fundamental differences over the nature, and especially the formation
and enforcement, of international law (thus to the first criterion,
above). These different views of international law determine how
states view the legitimacy of specific legal processes.

98.
Cf. Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181
(1996).
99.
Id. at 203.
100.
See, e.g., McDevitt, supra note 2; Mirski, supra note 8.
101.
Position Paper, supra note 14.
102.
See generally Ben Saul, China, Natural Resources, Sovereignty and
International Law, 37 ASIAN STUD. REV. 196, 201-05 (2013) (discussing such
perceptions of Chinese behavior in a more general context).
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The essence of the Chinese jurisdictional objection is rooted in
the international legal principle nemo dat quod non habet, which has
its origins in the Roman legal maxim nemo plus iuris ad alium
transferre potest quam ipse habet ("One cannot transfer to another
more right than one has oneself').103 Applied here, the principle
would indicate that a tribunal under UNCLOS is not empowered to
grant or assign rights attached to specific territory without clear
delineation of their origin in the proprietary rights of some particular
sovereign over that territory. 104 That is, as an international
instrument, UNCLOS empowers only legal determinations of specific
rights (held by a specific right-holding state), based on the consent of
the states that signed up to the treaty (and also subject to those
states' reservations, like China's 2006 reservation regarding
arbitration). In this classically realist view of international law, the
legitimacy of instruments, the obligations they create, and the
subsequent decisions they inform are in the final analysis always
based on the consent of thus-bound states. 10 5 Any binding ruling
emerging from UNCLOS must be based in such consent.
Although the United States frequently espouses much the same
interpretation of international law, 106 and indeed is itself not a party
to UNCLOS largely based on exactly these concerns, 10 7 in the present
instance, it has joined the Philippines to advocate a very different
legal philosophy. This view does not hold that a UNCLOS tribunal
can accord only legal rights that it can trace to origins in the specific
territorial ownership rights of particular states, who then transfer
determinations over the scope and interpretation of the rights to
UNCLOS on a consensual basis as states parties. In place of that
positivistic model, advocates of jurisdiction in Philippines v. China
hold that UNCLOS and other such international legal instruments
can serve as a priori determinations of possible rights, constraining
state behavior even if the actual holders of such rights are not

Ulpian, Digests of Justinian 50.17.54.
103.
104.
See Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and
Paracel Islands: A Historical and Legal perspective, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 399
(1991); see also, e.g., Crawford, supra note 51 (discussing the application of the nemo
dat principle to UNCLOS, especially in terms of its initial drafting process and the
problem of "representing" excluded states).
See generally Anthony Carty & Fozia N. Lone, Some New Haven
105
InternationalLaw Reflections on China, India and Their Various TerritorialDisputes,
19 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 95, 95 (2011) ("[I]n China and India, international law and
diplomacy are guided by a formalist dualism."); cf. Sienho Yee, The South China Sea
Arbitration(The Philippines v. China): Potential JurisdictionalObstacles or Objections,
13 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 663 (2014).
Cf. Harold H. Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
106.
REV. 1824, 1838-41 (1998) (discussing and rebutting extreme versions of the "statecentric" view in the U.S. context).
107.
See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, Friedmann Memorial Award Address, 49
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17, 24 (2010).
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identified. 10 8 General appellations for this view of international law
have included cosmopolitanism, Grotian eclecticism, and liberal
normativism.1 0 9 Irrespective of the exact terminology, the essence of
the distinction with the realist view is the position that legal issues
can be decided in the form of generally applicable formulae or
principles, defined in abstract terms, and then subsequently used to
judge real-world disputes. 110 With regards to the Philippines v. China
dispute, the Philippine-U.S. position is that there is indeed precisely
such a formula: nemo dat quod non habet. 11 1
The essence of the dispute over jurisdiction, in other words, is
that of the proper interpretation of the very same legal principle. In
the "cosmopolitan a priori" view advanced by the Philippines, the
nemo dat rule is a general principle that operates via international
instruments, such as UNCLOS, to constrain the possible legal claims
made by any state party. 112 On the basis of determining what kind of
claims could be validly recognized under the treaty, the Philippines
seeks judgments constraining all states bound to the treaty's
terms. 113 Against this view lies the realist or perhaps "positivist"
interpretation advanced by China, which considers nemo dat to be a
principle constraining the possible legal validity and enforcement
power of courts and tribunals-they can assign only such rights as
they can identify themselves as possessing based on their own
mandate and the rights that the parties submit to their jurisdiction.
This basic dispute over both legal doctrine and legal Weltanschauung*
leads to the two sides' very different views on the legitimacy of
Philippines v. China.
It is not necessary here to ultimately resolve this disagreement
in favor of one side or another. The present aim is rather to indicate
the fundamental and far-reaching nature of the disagreement and to
suggest that there is little indication that a favorable UNCLOS ruling
on jurisdiction would convince China that its application of the nemo
dat principle is flawed (as, indeed, the opposite result would be
unlikely to change Philippine views). The Chinese view could
plausibly be construed as an available interpretation of the principle

108.
Cf.Mirski, supra note 8.
109.
See, e.g., Edward Keene, The Reception of Hugo Grotius in International
Relations Theory, 20 GROTIANA 135, 154 (1999) (discussing different interpretations of
Grotian thought on state and international order).
110.
Cf. Louis B. Sohn, Generally Accepted International Rules, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1073 (1986).
111.
Mary George, Fisheries Protections in the Context of the Geo-Political
Tensions in the South China Sea, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 85, 103 (2012).
112.
Cf. McDevitt, supra note 2, at 13 ('The UNCLOS Convention does not deal
with matters of sovereignty.").
113.
Id. at 54.
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that "the land dominates the sea" (la terre domine la mer),114 which
has been summarized as holding that "[ilt is the land which confers
upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coasts." 1 15 That
being the case, the question as to who owns the land could
conceivably be legally prior to the delimitation of sea boundaries
stemming from that land. To some, the Philippine-U.S. advocacy of
the reverse approach seems to suggest instead that "the sea
dominates the land."
Yet the land will dominate, even if the arbitration goes forward:
States will continue to articulate their territorial ownership claims,
and the main way that they will do so, invoking the law of
"discovery," is the most dangerous side effect of UNCLOS's inability
to address sovereignty issues.
B. Historical Claims, Nationalism, and the DangerousAmbiguity of
"Discovery"
In addition to the legal and political issues noted above,
Philippine and U.S. objections to any Chinese articulations of claims
to sovereignty that invoke the U-shaped line or the concept of historic
rights do nothing to deter, or even to limit, various parties' South
China Sea claims based on a far more vague and amorphous legal
category: that of "discovery." 11 6 To the contrary, a Tribunal ruling
that fully addressed the issues raised in the Philippine submission
would, if anything, promote claimant states' outside pursuit of
territorial claims based on prior discovery and occupation. As will be
explained below, this result would be likely to have deleterious affects
for both the effective legal disposition of the question of territorial
ownership and for the underlying political contention between the
involved states. Absent additional action to clarify and unify the legal
discourse surrounding the core issue of territorial sovereignty, the
indirect effects of Philippines v. China risk deterring legal settlement,
escalating tensions, and promoting unilateral foreign policy
adventurism.
Discovery is just one of five traditional forms of lawful
acquisition of territory, the others being cession, annexation,

114.
For applications of this principle in other international adjudications, see,
e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgement, 2012 I.C.J. Rep.
1,
140 (Nov. 19); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), 2012 ITLOS Case No. 16, 185 (Mar.
14).
Anglo/Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Norway), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep.
115.
116, $T 128, 133; see also Anglo/Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Norway), Judgment,
1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 154 (separate opinion by Hsu Mo).
116.
See ROBERT Y. JENNINGS, THE AcQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-100 (1963).
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accretion, and prescription. 117 Of these, annexation is regarded as
having been outlawed by 1948's Nuremberg Tribunal decisions
regarding the crime of aggression, if not earlier. 118 Claims to the
other forms of territorial acquisition remain legal but are quite rare.
Discovery, though, is the most prevalent among them. This is in large
part due to its relatively simple formal and practical requirements,
originally requiring no more than being the first "civilized" power to
physically discover and assert claim to a "savage" tc'ritory, as "it may
be safe to say that before the eighteenth century discovery alone was
sufficient to acquire a valid title to a terra nullius."119 It is also,
however, due to the inherent political logic of the concept. Any state
that seeks to portray its political control of a territory as arising ex
nihilo-without any prior owners potentially presenting their own
claims or objections-is greatly incentivized to portray its acquisition
' 120
as "discovery."
It may seem to be an exceedingly counterintuitive claim that the
legal framework surrounding supposedly peaceful "discovery" could
be more dangerous and conflict provoking than that of aggressive
territorial "annexation." Yet, as this subpart argues, that is precisely
the case at least with regards to many of today's remaining territorial
disputes. This problem is particularly egregious in the context of the
South China Sea, because key parties' legal arguments based on pure
"discovery" are ill-suited to stimulating effective resolution of the
dispute. In particular, the European colonial expansionist concept of
"discovery" is uniquely ill-fitted to the East Asian historical context of
extremely long-term cultural affiliations with specific territories amid
fluid (and cyclically rising and falling) political structures and nonWestphalian concepts of "nationhood." 12 1 Yet the legal concept of
"discovery," asserting prior arrival in, laying claim to, and occupation
of a terra nullius, is in fact the ultimate basis for the territorial
122
claims of many modern states.
As a result, the question of ownership over the Paracel and
Spratly Islands is most often discussed in terms of alleged evidence of
just this sort of "discovery," 123 as indicated by either prior

117.
Id. at 6.
118.
Id. at 52-53.
119.
Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-Yu-Tai (Senkaku)
Islands and the Law of TerritorialAcquisition, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 221, 226 (1974) (citing
ARTHUR S. KELLER, OLIVER J. LISSITzYN & FREDERICK J. MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTS
OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMBOLIC ACTS 1400-1800 (1938)).
120.
Id. at 225.
121.
Cf. Coleman & Maogoto, supra note 75.
122.
See JENNINGS, supra note 116.
123.
See, e.g., Jianming Shen, International Law Rules and Historical
Evidences Supporting China's Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1997).
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presence, 124 prior formal declaration of legal ownership, 125 or
continuous usage and occupation. 126 For states seeking to vindicate
their claims, however, this approach presents five key problems: (1) it
is extremely difficult for involved states to be legally certain that they
will be regarded as succeeding to all of the interests of all of their
relevant dynastic predecessors; 12 7 (2) likewise, it is quite challenging
based on the quality of existing records to assert definitively that
subjects of only one state exclusively occupied and made use of the
South China Sea islands; 128 (3) the question as to what constitutes
effective "symbolic" assertion of sovereign ownership based on
discovery has never been adequately cleared up even among Western
European powers, 12 9 let alone in the context of traditional East Asian
political discourse, thus adding a high risk of uncertainty and
arbitrariness into any ultimate court finding as to what did or did not
constitute "declaration" of territorial ownership; (4) the question of
when the customary requirement of "occupation" was activated, thus
potentially allowing previous sovereign ownership to expire, has
never been adequately settled and thus injects yet another note of
uncertainty; 130 and (5) even if "discovery" were adequately proven by
a given state, the ownership thus obtained would still be potentially
subject to a finding of later dispossession via annexation by or cession
to another power (if an argument could successfully be made that
there was widespread legal recognition of such a transfer). 131
Discovery thus promotes nationalist, unequal dichotomies between
the "civilized" and the "savage," while also failing to provide any
ultimate legal answers to the issue of contemporary ownership.
C. Abandoning the Discovery and Occupation Paradigm
As noted above, the "discovery" paradigm of territorial
acquisition is closely bound up with the distinctly European
Enlightenment-era (colonial) conception of positive imposition of legal
control over "savage" territory by the representatives of civilized
scientific rationality. 132 As such, this legal framework is inseparable

124.
125.

Id. at 11.
Id.

126.

Id.

127.

Cf. James Mayall, Nationalism, Self-Determination, and the Doctrine of

Territorial Unity, in SETTLING SELF-DETERMINATION DISPUTES: COMPLEX POWERSHARING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8-11 (Marc Weller, Barbara Metzger & Niall

Johnson eds., 2008).
128.

See, e.g., HAYTON, supra note 76.

129.
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See Cheng, supra note 119.
Id.

131.
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Cf. JENNINGS, supra note 116.
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(2003)

exploration of the European legal concept of "discovery" along these lines).

(offering an
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from the concept of a state of nature that the "discoverer" has left
behind but that the "discovered" land and its residents still inhabit.
There is no reason to assume that this conception has any essential
metaphysical veracity; to the contrary, as argued in this Article, the
notion of "discovery" is especially ill suited to, if not invalidated, by
the example of East Asian political history.
At the same time, however, the modern framework of
international law does not recognize the sort of gradual accretion of
territorial influence that lie at the core of traditional East Asian
state-building practices. 133 The positivist foundations of international
law, in particular, require that rights be conceptualized via the
''ownership" paradigm of presumably exclusive enjoyment (except
where very deliberately excepted from this paradigm). 134 With
regards to the specific territorial disputes of the South China Sea, the
pre-European lack of clearly articulated assertions of legal title in the
idiom of exclusive territorial control complicates not only each
individual state's attempts to assert its "discovery" of the disputed
lands as terrae nullius, but also impedes the prospects of any effective
legal determination of the issue.
When today's disputants make arguments for sovereignty based
on "discovery," they essentially put themselves in the position of
colonial-era European states vis-A-vis any non-European inhabitants
or potential competing claimants to the territory in question. An
essential, a priori element of the concept of "discovery" is that of an
unequal legal status between the "discoverer" and the "discovered."
Indeed, arguably much of the international order lies atop
relationships of fundamental inequality stemming from the colonial
and imperialistic appropriations of wealth and territory associated
135
with the invention and application of this concept.
It is unsurprising, then, that other states in the region react so
vociferously when one of their competing claimants invokes
arguments based on discovery of South China Sea territoriespotentially at stake is their very status as a "civilized" people, at least
at a given historical point. Perhaps even more importantly, however,

133.
Cf. HAYTON, supra note 76; Coleman & Maogoto, supra note 75.
134.
See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing Activities in Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4,
18 U.S.T. at 2410, 2413-14, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 208 (The Moon and other celestial bodies
are to be used by treaty parties "exclusively for peaceful purposes"); The Antarctic
Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. 1(1), 12 U.S.T. at 794, 795, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 72 ("Antarctica
shall be used for peaceful purposes only.").
135.
See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111-14 (2007); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 19596 (2003). See generally SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY (2011); DIPESH
CHAKARABARTY, PROVISIONALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL
DIFFERENCE (2009).
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states react with such vehemence precisely because it is so easy to
make discovery-based claims-each state has its own, incompatible
with all others. Thus China and Taiwan both claim the contested
South China Sea territories in part based on arguments of their
"discovery" as terra nullius during the ancient Han Dynasty; Vietnam
claims either eighteenth or nineteenth century discovery of its
claimed territories or succession to French possessions based on the
latter's acts of discovery (in the early twentieth century); while the
Philippines bases some of its territorial claims on the argument that
the South China Sea territories became terra nullius after being
abandoned by their occupier Japan at the end of World War 11.136
These claims are mutually irreconcilable and as noted, in some cases
require comprehensive negative assessments of the civilizational level
of other claimants.
Indeed, to a large extent, the legal and factual confusion over
just what "discovery" might mean in the South China Sea context is
the legacy of colonial aggression and acquisition through the postwar
period. The French act of "discovery" in 1929 is a major case in point.
As contemporary accounts indicate, when the French made their
landing, they found Chinese already living there: "Only the little
frigate La Malicieuse could disembark some men onto the isle of
Spratly (or Tempest Isle) . . . while on Thi-Tu there were found five
Chinese, and on the Twin Isles, there were seven, in sum and
total." 13 7 These prior residents had constructed on the island various
accoutrements of what they undoubtedly considered as "civilized" life,
including domiciles and a small temple, as well as planting various
crops. 13 8 They were also visited "once per year" by a Chinese ship
carrying various goods. 139 Despite their small number, the prior
presence of these Chinese citizens potentially supports the Chinese
ontention that "[t]he Nansha [Spratly] Islands and nearby sea areas

Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25
136.
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 61, 66-67 (1994) ("[T]he Chinese place a great deal of emphasis
on the fact that the Japanese surrendered the island to the Chinese, and not to the
French, who occupied some of the islands prior to their seizure by the Japanese in
1939.").
See REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LiGISLATION COMPARPE (1934)
137.
(noting prior presence of Chinese inhabitants in South China Sea isles when France
purported to 'discover' them as terra nullius); see also REVUE FRANCO-CHINOISE, 13-14,
323 (1932) ("Les quelques Hainanais qui vivent dans Vil6t de Thi-tu, cercl6 de lagons oil
d'admirables poissons colorent les eaux limpides de toute la gamme des couleurs de
l'arc-en-ciel, paraissent jouir d'un bonheur sans mlange.").
BOLETIM GERAL DAS COL6NIAS, 98-102, 210 (1933) ("[S]6 encontraram
138.
habitantes chineses em Thi-tu e Twin. Os chineses tinham plantado ali coqueiros, chd e
batatas.").
La Controversiaentre Jap6n y Francia.- Guano y Fosfato. - Interpetaci6n.
139.
- Nacionalidadque Permanece en el Misterio., HOY 2, 37, (1933) ('lUnos pocos chinos se
encontraron en Thi-Tu y las islas Gemelas. Un Junco chino les traia alimentos una vez
al afio.").
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have been a part of China's territories since ancient times, but some
neighboring countries have long been illegally occupying some of the
islands." 14 0 It would, naturally, be difficult for any court to convince
China to accept that the Spratlys were terra nullius when its citizens
14 1
lived there and only became "civilized" after the arrival of France.
Like France, Japan also claimed rights as a "discoverer" of the
14 2
South China Sea territories during the early twentieth century.
Though both of these colonial powers' claims drew protests from the
embattled Chinese Republican government (including the first known
appearances of the U-shaped line claim), they were to some extent
successful in achieving international recognition. 143 In an ironic
parallel with the situation today, at the height of the dispute between
these two colonial powers, just before Japan launched its occupation
forces in 1939, France offered to bring the issue of South China Sea
sovereignty to international arbitration at the Permanent Court of
Justice. 144 Japan declined, insisting that its "discovery"-based claim
preceded that of France and that the latter had unlawfully occupied
its territory in attempted annexation. 145
As is revealed in a memorandum by U.S. President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt to his Secretary of State, even the United States at
one point considered making a "discovery"-based claim to the
Spratlys. 146 The administration ultimately decided not to do so,
however, partly in order to support French protests against Japan's

140.
Don't Excessively Interpret South China Sea Drill, CHINADAILY USA (July
26, 2015), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-O7/26/content-21409474.htm [http://
perma.cc/A98S-WBC7] (archived Feb. 15, 2016) (citing a 2015 statement by the
People's Liberation Army Navy Spokesman Liang Yang).
See, e.g., China-France-JapanTrilateralRelations Concerning the South
141.
China Sea Nine Small Islands Issue, DIPLOMACY MONTHLY (Waijiao Yuebao) (Aug.
1933).
142.
See id.; see also Dzurek, supra note 65, at 9 (explaining Japanese presence
on the Spratly islands since 1918 and the introduction of Japanese phosphate
companies to the islands in the late 1920s).
143.
See Dzurek, supra note 65, at 10 (discussing Chinese protests to French
activities on the Spratly islands because "the Chinese foreign ministry publically
affirmed Chinese sovereignty of the islands").
144.
Southward Advance of Japanese Expansionist Movement: Hainan and the
Spratly Islands, 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC PAPERS:
THE FAR EAST 103, 114 (1939) ("The French note proposed the settlement of the long
standing controversy over the ownership of the Islands by submission to arbitration.
The Japanese note answers with the announcements that Japan has assumed
jurisdiction over Spratley [sic] Islands on March 30, 1939.").
145.
See id. ('The Japanese contested the French claim and the dispute has
been carried on with a long exchange of notes each party basing its title to ownership
on prior occupation.").
146.
See id. at 16 (detailing President Roosevelt's opinion on the ownership of
the Spratly Islands, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs writes: 'The
Ambassador inquired whether we were going to take any action in the matter
[ownership of Spratly Islands]. I replied that we still had the matter under study.").
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occupation of the islands. 14 7 Britain, likewise, decided to forgo its own
previously articulated discovery claims to the Spratlys in favor of
France. 148 Nonetheless, the very same year, France suffered a regime
change following invasion by Germany, and the new Vichy
149
government decided not to continue protesting Japan's claims.
Indeed, France dropped the matter of South China Sea sovereignty
during or after the war, 150 a stance continuing into the present day
(though any eventual ruling on the arguments of today's claimant
states would also likely call for courts to interpret the validity and
current status of French claims).
Clearly, then, there is little current basis for common consensus
on the question as to who "discovered" the South China Sea islands
and when. Any effective prospects for legal resolution of the question
of sovereign ownership must not commit a priori to the establishment
of any date of "discovery," but should instead attempt simply to unify
the various legal arguments of different claimants in a common idiom
and agree on a set of shared facts and legal principles. An
international Commission of Inquiry (COI) among involved states
would make this possible, in particular by maintaining a narrow
historical focus on the problematic legal status of former French and
Japanese territorial claims. More specifically, the process of resolving
this legal question could enable judicial investigators to give more
concrete legal meaning (and thus limitation) to the "discovery"
paradigm of sovereignty as it pertains to the region, most likely by
means of analyzing both colonial powers' claims to the discovery and
occupation of terra nullius and determining whether such claims
were viable (in light of all other parties' protests against such claims
as well as the applicable legal doctrines of territorial acquisition).
Though a modest approach, this structure would at least refocus
the discourse surrounding the South China Sea from one in which the
key parties are talking past each other-in large part because they
mean very different things by the term "international law"t 5 1-into
one where all parties concerned are engaged in the same

Id. at 116
147.
See id. at 116-17 (detailing Britain's condemnation of Japan under
148.
international law after Japan pronounced its ownership over the Spratly islands).
149.
See MARWYN S. SAMUELS, CONTEST FOR THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 64-66
(2013).
See id. ("[B]y February 1943 the circle was drawn tight when, with the
150.
agreement of the Vichy government, Japanese forces occupied the French leasehold of
Kuang-chou Wan and thereby effectively cut off all but the most clandestine oceanfront access to Chinese nationalist forces holding out in Szechuan Province.").
On the universalist normativity of international law, and the inherent
151.
tensions with its particular origins in the practices of colonial European states
exploiting non-Western peoples and their polities, see, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the
Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century InternationalLaw, 40
HARv. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1999) (examining impact of nineteenth-century colonialism on
positivism and jurisprudence under international law).
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conversation, attempting to answer the same questions. In the
context of complex geopolitical disputes, this positivistic clarity 152 is
precisely what law is best situated to offer.

IV. BENEFITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

A. A Modern Innovation for a Multipolar World
Regarding international law's legitimacy and enforcement
dilemmas, Myres McDougal wrote that "[u]nless there is a basic
acceptance of the system of public order no community exists; where
no community of loyalty, belief, and faith exists, no rational process of
decision can occur, since recommendations will proceed on
irreconcilable assumptions." 153 That, as has been described in this
Article, is precisely the underlying problem with regard to the
Philippines v. China arbitration as well as the South China Sea
dispute more generally. In addition to identifying the problem at this
general level, McDougal also elaborated in his work a key metric for
evaluating its manifestation in specific instances: the question of
whether states have competing or irreconcilable hierarchies of
values. 154

As suggested above in Part III, China and the Philippines are
advocating very different views regarding such basic international
legal principles as nemo dat and "the land dominates the sea." While
interpreting the same body of legal rules, the two sides reach
different outcomes precisely due to a disagreement as to the
hierarchy of values underlying the rules being interpreted. In China's
case, to reiterate, the apparent highest value is the positivistic
assumption that the legitimacy of legal rules is in the final instance
always determined by state consent. 15 5 On the Philippine-U.S. side
lies the alternative view that the highest value of international law is
a prioristic rulemaking and the establishment of shared communal
norms. 156

152.
Cf. Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics:
International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International
Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 401, 402 (2002) (interpreting "[Lassa] Oppenheim's positivist
insistence that international law rules be based on consent" and arguing that "the
vitality of mainstream positivist traditions in international law has been sustained by
a deeply felt commitment to the ethical view that legal positivism provides the best
means for international lawyers to promote realization of fundamental political and
moral values.").
153.
MYRES McDOUGAL, HAROLD LASSWELL, & IVAN VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC
ORDER IN SPACE 1054 (1963).
154.
See MYRES S. MACDOUGAL & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A
FREE SOCIETY 1-6 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1992).
155.
See generally THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION, supra note 3.
156.
See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 8,at 34; Mirski, supra note 8.
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A resolution to the current dispute would be much easier, at
least as a legal matter, if one side or the other was "wrong." However,
this is not the case, for "[t]here [is] no well-developed and
authoritative hierarchy of values in international law." 15 7 As a result,
even more so than is already the case within domestic jurisdictions,
international legal decisions can reach markedly different conclusions
depending on decision makers' valuation of different factors, such as
158
the rights of sovereign states or the universal rights of individuals.
To accommodate the impossibility of resolving by fiat
fundamental interstate differences over hierarchies of value,
McDougal and other representatives of the New Haven School of
international legal theory advocated "a public order which is designed
to promote the greatest production and widest sharing of all values
and which in its power processes, in particular, is oriented toward a
minimum of coercion and a maximum of persuasion." 159 The
resulting order, then, would have to be one that adopts as a basic
principle the need for maximally inclusive rules and institutional
mechanisms aimed at diminishing what Jacques Ranci~re has termed
dissensus: the fundamental clash between incompatible collective
16 0
worldviews based on different epistemologies of value.
The chief need, then, is for a mechanism that enables states that
wish to resolve their conflicts, but that bring to the table markedly,
different Weltanschauungen, to gradually work towards beneficial
solutions, mutual understanding, and accommodation. As will be
argued in this Part, the Commission of Inquiry (COI)mechanism is in
many ways the most viable institutional tool states have available to
them for these purposes. The concept of the COI was designed at the
turn of the twentieth century, in a world of newly equal (and newly
globalized) states, which sought to recognize their equal status while
making allowances for fundamental differences over the ideal world
16 1
order, stemming from different hierarchies of value.
COIs were introduced as a potential means for resolving
international disputes in the first Hague Convention of 1899, and
then again endorsed and expanded in the second Hague Convention
of 1907.162 The idea of an independent transnational process of

Report of the International Law Commission, 54 U.N. GAOR Suppl. No.
157.
10, at 240. U.N. Doc. A/ 57/10 (2002).
158.
On the distinctions between these two forms of "egalitarianism" (and an
analysis of their shared intellectual origins), see Jean Cohen, Whose Sovereignty?
Empire Versus InternationalLaw, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1, 16-17 (2004).
Myres S. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International
159.
Law: A Policy-OrientedFramework of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 337, 343 (1960).
See generally RANCItERE, supra note 4.
160.
161.
See McDougal, supra note 159, at 347-49.
162.
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague
Convention ) art. 9 (35), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, http://avalon.law.yale.edu
20thcentury/pacific.asp#art9 [https://perma.cc/7WRR-CPLT] (archived Feb. 16, 2016).
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establishing a group of inquirers to investigate the facts of disputed
or controversial incidents was largely a new innovation, although a
few international legal instruments had previously provided for
inquiry processes (e.g., in order to resolve complex preexisting
disputes between parties to a peace treaty.)1 63 Yet, unlike these
predecessors, the COI was conceptualized as a perpetually available
tool for states to use in the context of increasingly complex global ties
and, in particular, the difficult project of managing the world's ever
164
more crowded sea lanes.
The earliest applications of the new mechanism were thus in the
so-called vessel inquiries, 165 which intended to facilitate the
resolution of the circumstances and allocation of responsibility over
occasional altercations between major sea powers. Thus, the very first
Hague Convention COI was the 1905 Dogger Bank inquiry, 16 6 which
was occasioned by a Russian naval ship's firing at UK fishing vessels
after mistaking them for enemy Japanese torpedo boats in the midst
of the Russo-Japanese War. The incident, which sparked a serious
diplomatic altercation and was seen as potential cause for military
confrontation given contemporary geopolitics, was frequently referred
to in the United Kingdom as the "Russian Outrage." 167 Dogger Bank
was the first opportunity for great powers to demonstrate their ability
to unite, in accordance with The Hague principles, in the collective
attempt to constrain and limit sources of dispute while maximizing
potential areas of agreement.
The proceedings were in many ways exemplary of the originally
intended role and function of the original COIs. Occurring in the
context of a war between Russia and a rising Japan (allied with
Britain), the underlying incident certainly had great potential for
sparking further military or diplomatic conflagration. Yet the use of
the COI, which had originally been proposed by the Estonian-Russian
jurist Friedrich Martens, 168 eventually managed to unite the two
parties, Britain and Russia, in common acknowledgment of the
improper but partially inadvertent nature of the Russian naval
actions in question. Unlike a litigation, this outcome was reached by
means of an independent committee's establishment, via inquisitorial
methods, of certain basic facts (in that case, specific movements of

163.
See Norman L. Hill, International Commissions of Inquiry and
Conciliation, 15 INT'L CONCILIATION 89, 91 (1932); see also van den Herik, supra note
18, at 508 (discussing the transformation of international commissions of inquiry since
the early 20th century).
164.
See van den Herik, supra note 18, at 510.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. at 513.
167.
Id. at 514.
168.
Id. at 510 ("As the intellectual father of the concept, Friedrich Martens
believed than an impartial establishment of the facts and circumstances surrounding
international disputes would help cooling off emotions.").
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ships and issuance of military commands, based on accounts by
various parties present at the time), with no specific damages
awarded, blame sought, or penalty imposed-though the mere
establishment of key facts eventually proved enough to motivate
apology and compensation by Russia to Britain over the acts of one of
its officers. 169 The process successfully helped defuse the incident.
Various other COIs were deployed in similar maritime contexts
in the years that followed. As a means of resolving contentious,
potentially volatile disagreements, the new inquiry model was seen as
incorporating some of the best aspects of preexisting forms of dispute
settlements, serving as "a tool that married the independence of
arbitration with the flexibility and souplesse of mediation." 170 Indeed,
in some of the earliest theoretical investigations of the promising role
of the mechanism in helping to order the multipolar world
community-a vital concern given the complex balance of power
dynamics characterizing the period-it was precisely this souplesse
("flexibility, elasticity, or suppleness") that served as its most
171
valuable function.
This mechanism, however, fell into disuse in the years leading
up to World War II, as flexibility and accommodation became
increasingly rare objectives in interstate relations. 172 During the
Cold War era, as well, the period of dormancy continued, largely due
to such factors as the tense international structure of competing
alliances, proxy regimes, and extremely centralized military and
173
diplomatic decision making on both sides of the ideological divide.
Important factors promoting the attempt to discover and make use of
conciliatory mechanisms, such as COIs and high levels of economic
integration and expanding diplomatic and commercial ties, were also
largely absent from U.S.-Soviet relations. Following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, however, COIs were rediscovered beginning in the
1990s and put to novel use in the context of official international
inquiry into situations of possible human rights abuse or violation of
174
similarly grave international customary norms.
The mechanism was seen as particularly suitable for such
contexts for a number of reasons, among these being (1) the relatively
low amount of political and diplomatic capital required to establish
them-as opposed to, official tribunals empowered to pass binding

169.
See Hill, supra note 163, at 13 (stating that Russia paid $300,000 in
damages to Britain); van den Herik, supra note 18, at 514.
See van den Herik, supra note 18, at 511 (citing N. Politis, Les
170.
Commissions internationales den quote, REVUE GINRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 149, 150 (1912)).
171.

172.
mechanism
173.
174.

See id.

Id. at 518 (describing a more rigid application of a dispute resolution
during the decade preceding World War II).
See id. at 534.
See id. at 520.
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judgments as a matter of international criminal law; (2) the
collaborative nature of the proceedings that meshed well with the
fundamental premise of international human rights law investigation
that the rights identified are "universal" norms of the entire
community of nations (not particular political assertions by one or a
group of states); and (3) the flexibility or souplesse afforded by this
tool in terms of defining both the exact nature of the inquiry,
particularly the highly adjustable degree to which it is conceptualized
as making legal versus factual determinations, and, relatedly, the
concomitant lack of any significant restrictions on the possible forms
of subsequent conciliation between parties. 17 5 These factors have
informed, for example, recent use of the mechanism to address
human rights abuses in North Korea, 176 with a COI on the issue
established under the UN Human Rights Council making greater
progress on international consensus over the problem's severity than
any other approach (though some critique the degree to which
modern human rights COls do not aim at conciliation per se but
1 77
rather "to condemn and provoke").
Indeed, it is largely for the same three qualities of moderation,
collaboration, and flexibility that the COI was in its initial maritime
forms regarded as itself constituting a form of conciliation,by means
of which parties could reach a modus vivendi regarding potentially
conflict-inducing incidents or behavior. 178 In the South China Sea
context as well, the use of a COI to address one significant aspect of
the various competing territorial claims promises the potential for a
moderate, collaborative, and flexible new institution that could be
used to serve as a basis for further settlement. 179 At the same time, a
COI on the initial and current status of French and Japanese
territorial claims would, whatever its findings, function as a means to
unify the disparate arguments of today's various claimants,
discouraging asymmetrical rhetoric of the "discoverers" against
"discovered," or of exclusionary ethno-nationalist totalities, while

175.
As Politis wrote, the ideal outcome of a COI was in essence conciliatory: a
"calmantsalutaire."Politis, supra note 170, at 172.
176.
G.A. Resolution 22/13, U.N. Doe. A/HRC/RES/22/13, at 1 (April 9, 2013).
Nonetheless, with regards to the scope of international collaboration and
177.
consensus facilitated by the COI report, see, e.g., Donald S. Zagoria, The Future of
U.S.-Japan-ChinaRelations, NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
(2014), https://www.ncafp.org/2016/wp-content/uploads/2014/12[NCAFP-US-Japan-Ch
(archived
ina-Trilateral -ReportTokyo-Nov-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc[UV2D-BZEX]
Feb. 16, 2016) ("[Y]ears of international pressure on the regime over its nuclear and
missile programs, its violation of its international obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, its military provocations against its neighbors, and its threats to
use nuclear weapons against others have not elicited the reaction that the COI report
has received from the international community.").
178.
See van den Herik, supra note 18, at 513.
179.
See id. at 511-12.
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providing grounds for common discourse in the idiom of formal legal
equality.
The following subparts will examine the potential institutional
basis, composition, mandate, and ultimate effects of a COI
investigating the issue of colonial sovereignty claims in the South
China Sea.
B. "Arbitrationin Disguise?Law and Facts in Institutionalized
Inquiry
This subpart addresses practical steps that could be taken in
order to establish a COI, as well as determine its more specific
mandate in relation to the South China Sea dispute. In addition to
states' independent ability to simply establish a COI based on their
own multilateral initiative, 180 various existing international
institutions could also serve as the basis for such a mechanism. These
include, for example, (1) a COI established under the auspices of
UNCLOS, with a status similar to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf; 18 1 or (2) one conducted under the offices of the
UN Secretary General, acting either proprio motu 182 or via the
recommendation of the General Assembly 183 or the UN Security
Council; or (3) one under the independent power of investigation of
the UN Security Council, acting in accordance with Article 34 of the
UN Charter (allowing the Security Council to investigate "any
situation or dispute whose continuation might endanger international
peace and security"); 184 or, finally, (4) one established under one of
the constituent bodies within the International Court of Justice or
one of the other primary UN organs, with the added caveat that the
COI must be seen as falling sufficiently within the mandate of that
18 5
body to be activated by its implied powers.
Of these various options, an initiative of the Security Council
would no doubt be the most authoritative and legally significant
forum. Moreover, the Security Council would potentially not need to

180.
Id. at 517-18.
181.
Id.
See U.N. Charter, Chapter XV art. 98-99 ('The Secretary-General may
182.
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."); see also G.A. Res.
13, Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of
46/59, art. II
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Dec. 9, 1991).
10 ("The General Assembly
See G.A. Res. 46/59, supra note 182, art. II
183.
should consider the possibility of undertaking fact-finding for exercising effectively its
responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and
security.").
See van den Herik, supra note 18, at 524 (citing E.L. Kerley, The Powers of
184.
Investigation of the United Nations Security Council, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 898
(1961)).
Id. at 528.
185.
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either recommend the action of the Secretary General or make use of
its own implied powers in order to set up a COI for the South China
Sea. 186 Rather, a COI could be validly erectedmunder the Article 34
competence, precisely to address the question of whether the
competing territorial claims in the region are at least sufficiently
determinate and susceptible to eventual legal disposition that any
further political engagement by the Security Council is unnecessary.
Not only would such a COI inevitably answer that question in the
affirmative, but its framing would also further pacify the situation by
quelling various claimants' concerns over potential future United
Nations' condoning of interventionist measures by concerned foreign
powers (which would be strongly discouraged by a preliminary Article
34 finding that further Security Council engagement was
unnecessary). A preliminary finding of this nature would also
contribute to the goal (stated by all parties) of avoiding further
militarization of the dispute.
The most expedient option for setting up a COI, however, would
be for states to simply make use of The Hague Convention processes
to do so as a multilateral legal agreement. This would be greatly
facilitated by the usage of the originally facilitated procedures
specified under the Convention, which fill in general parameters such
as the scope of the mandate to be expected as well as the division
between factual and legal considerations. 187 This last point is,
perhaps, the most difficult question to determine ahead of time, but
as a general matter states are expected to conduct COIs in order to
make factual assertions, rather than ultimate legal determinations of
the sort made by arbitral tribunals. The conciliatory aspect of the COI
in large part depends on parties' understanding that its essential role
is that of an objective factual investigation not inherently tied to any
legal regime of specified rights or obligations (though these are
inevitably present in at least an implicit capacity and can lead to
semi-juridical outcomes involving settlements or reparations, as in
the Dogger Bank inquiry).
The complex balancing act involved in characterizing specific
investigative determinations as being either factual or legal has led
some, even in the earliest era of COIs, to characterize the
mechanisms as "arbitrations in disguise." 188 This was, certainly,
always a latent quality of the tool given the degree to which it
married the flexibility of mediation with the public, procedural, and
more (ideally) objective nature of arbitral decision making. Yet the
"disguise," to the extent that there is one, signifies only that states
may find themselves cooperating beyond the scope of the initial
allocation of fact-finding authority-not that they will be compelled

186.
187.
188.

See id.
See id.
Politis, supra note 170, at 156.
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to do so, or to accept any legal determinations not envisioned within
the mandate of the inquiry as initially defined.
Because the COI mechanism is most useful in precisely those
instances where formal legal arbitration is viewed as unfeasible due
to the reluctance of one or more parties to submit to institutions that
they feel may not fully represent their interests or the strength of
their legal positions, it is necessary as an initial matter to carefully
modulate the degree to which issues pending investigation are
defined as determinations of law rather than fact. Thus, in the case of
a COI for the South China Sea territorial dispute, it would be
necessary to avoid an overly broad scope of inquiry such that core
differences regarding the underlying conceptual dispute (or dissensus)
between China and the Philippines would be implicated by the
mechanism. As the purpose of a Commission for the South China Sea
would be precisely to "conciliate and pacify," it is imperative that it
adopt the older "maritime" model of objective and transparent
investigation in lieu of moralized or politically volatile investigative
practices that sometimes characterize modern human rights COIs, or
of addressing any issues outside of its narrow mandate.
A narrow focus on the territorial status of the South China Sea's
islands during the period of sovereignty claims by France and Japan
(two then-colonial powers that now make no claims to the territory)
would allow determinations of key issues regarding the potential
scope of acceptable claims by currently involved states. It would,
nonetheless, be able to constrain its findings within the realm of
factual, rather than currently active legal issues, as its core
determinations would inevitably constitute historical, or even
philological, inquiry into the perceived legal requirements of
discovery claims among the nations of the international community in
the 1920s-1940s, and the degree to which French and Japanese
claims met these requirements at the time. As noted, the legal
principle of territorial acquisition by discovery would be significantly
constrained (in its application to the South China Sea) regardless of
the COT's ultimate findings. Yet, while reducing the scope of possible
legal claims to a more manageable number and quality, the COI
would not have to make any determinations of the present rights or
obligations of parties. Just as issues of sovereignty are outside of the
scope of UNCLOS (which does purport to regulate the international
law obligations of parties that stem from that treaty), so too would all
legal rights and obligations be outside the scope of a fact finding COI
on unresolved colonial claims to South China Sea territorial
sovereignty.
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C. Key PotentialFindings: The Unavailabilityof Discovery and
Conquest
Regardless of what findings are ultimately made by a COI on the
issue of the colonial-era claims to South China Sea sovereignty, much
will turn on two events that occurred in 1928: (1) the influential PCJ
decision Island of Palmas (regarding a nearby island territorial
dispute between the United States and the Netherlands), 189 which
has significant legal repercussions for interpreting the availability
and criteria for determinations of territorial acquisition via discovery;
and (2) the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty under the auspices of
the League of Nations, by means of which states parties "outlawed
war" and, concomitantly, legitimate territorial acquisition by means
190
of annexation.
The Island of Palmas arbitration concerned sovereignty over an
island lying between the U.S.-occupied Philippines and Dutch
possessions in Indonesia. 191 The two Western states each asserted
competing claims based on "discovery" of the small island territory,
with the United States claiming to have succeeded to Spanish rights
that originated from the latter's "discovery" of the Philippines and
outlying islands 192 (as noted above, the United States later
considered making a similar claim over the Spratly islands as well,
but eventually decided not to do so). Eventually, however, the United
States lost the arbitration precisely due to a ruling on the
requirements of asserting effective discovery, with the panel finding
that mere physical discovery without long-term use and occupation
was insufficient to confer territorial sovereignty. 193 Long-term Dutch
usage conferred upon the Netherlands a stronger claim than that
194
available to the United States.
The same year, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was negotiated and
signed in Paris, providing that all signatories would renounce war as
a means to resolve disputes or conflicts between them. 19 5 Following
initial signatures by France, the United States, and Germany, it was
in total adopted by sixty-two countries and officially came into effect
in 1929.196 One of its first and most fundamental legal effects was to

189.
See generally Philip C. Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J.
INT'L L.735 (1928) (summarizing the arbitration between the United States and the
Netherlands over the ownership of the Island of Palmas, which resulted in a favorable
decision for the Netherlands).
190.

ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME: THE ORIGINS OF THE KELLOGG-

BRIAND PACT 35 (1952).
191.
Jessup, supra note 189, at 735.
192.
See id. at 737.
193.
See id. at 737-39.
194.
Id. at 744-45.
195.
See, e.g., FERRELL, supra note 190, at 166, 240.
196.
See id. at 258.
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make legally impossible for all signatories claims to valid legal
territorial acquisition through wars of conquest.197 Though some
dispute the legal effect of the Pact, or its binding nature (e.g., due to
concerns over the lack of enforcement provisions), there is at
minimum a strong case to be made for its validity as an international
legal prohibition on aggressive war, binding upon all states parties
(and perhaps even establishing a customary prohibition that would
19 8
have effect for non-parties, as well).
This unavailing character of claims based on territorial conquest
is perhaps the most clear-cut finding that a COI could make, but in
combination with the delimitation of discovery claims that this
Article argues the mechanism could also effect, it would have
dramatic consequences for the potential validity of French and
Japanese assertions of territorial sovereignty during the period in
question. Given both France's and Japan's signing of the KelloggBriand Pact, they could not legally acquire title to the island
territories of the South China Sea by annexation at any point after
that date. This would likely leave only possible claims based on
discovery or official cession, given that "accretion" is not relevant to
the territories in question.
With regards to discovery claims, both the Island of Palmascase
and other international legal decisions of the time indicate that
neither France nor Japan likely undertook sufficient activities of use
and occupation to assert a valid claim, even if it were assumed that
the territories were indeed terra nullius before the arrival of one or
both powers (a determination, again, that would be difficult to assert
as a reasonable statement of fact in any objective sense). In the
ClippertonIsland arbitration of 1931,199 for instance, France was the
beneficiary of a ruling articulating precisely this principle, when it
200
was granted sovereignty over an island in a dispute with Mexico.
The Clipperton Island ruling largely centered on the requirements of
20 1
occupation and usage, which were found to favor French claims.
Like the panel in Island of Palmas, the panel in Clipperton
Island found that it was not sufficient for a state to assert sovereignty
based solely on the act of physical discovery, which conferred only an
"inchoate title" and the right to incorporate the island into the
discovering state's possession. 20 2 In addition to the creation of the
right to take possession, the legal claim of territorial acquisition by

See id. at 261.
197.
See id.
198.
See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Clipperton Island Case, 27 AM. J. INT'L L.
199.
130, 132-33 (1933) (analyzing the impact of the Clipperton Case, a territorial dispute
between France and Mexico).
200.
Id. at 130.
See id. at 131.
201.
Id. at 132.
202.
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discovery was found by the panel to also require the exercise of the
right via "the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession ... [by
20 3
taking] steps to exercise exclusive authority there."
If it could be demonstrated that either France or Japan
effectively discovered the South China Sea island territories as terrae
nullius, and took legally sufficient action to occupy and take
possession of them, then this might be sufficient to establish valid
legal title. Yet, without the legally sufficient second step, "[t]he title
of discovery ... would ... exist only as an inchoate title, as a claim to
establish sovereignty by effective occupation . . . [, which] however
cannot prevail over a definite title founded on continuous and
peaceful display of sovereignty." 20 4 Largely due to the geopolitical
exigencies of this volatile time in world history-with French forces
expelled from the region by the Japanese navy, which in its turn was
driven from the territories following World War 11-neither state
would likely be able to demonstrate effective use and occupation
sufficient to confer territorial sovereignty as per Island of Palmas and
20 5
Clipperton Island.
The only plausible remaining form of territorial acquisition
available to the powers would thus be cession: that is, mutually
voluntary assignation of territory from one state to another. Given
the various protests issued among France, Japan, and China
throughout the pre-war period, 20 6 it would perhaps be challenging to
assert that any of these powers (or today's other claimants) could be
found to have clearly ceded its rights to another-though of course a
COI would have to diligently investigate this possibility. Moreover,
"cession" has traditionally been an extremely elastic concept in
international law, and could at least potentially be constructively
inferred by various forms of inaction or passive recognition of a
foreign state's claims. Most significantly, a COI that eliminated
"discovery" and "annexation" as available bases for sovereignty, thus
forcing today's claimants to argue in terms of "cession," would thus
privilege a more positivistic and legally determinate discourse, based
on the correct interpretation of modern communications between
various states, rather than on ancient history or vague, culturally
specific notions of "empty" territory. If there is ever to be a mutually
satisfactory determination regarding sovereignty in the South China
Sea, it will have to be the outcome of some form or forms of cession;
yet even before that point, simply refraining the dispute in terms of
cession would also help to dissuade escalating militarization and
aggression.

203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Cf. SAMUELS, supra note 149.
Id.
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Regardless of the COI's findings regarding cession (or, indeed
discovery), it would still have the salutary effects argued for in this
Article, as will be further explained below.
D. Effects: Clarifying Claims and Reframing the Legal Discourse
A collaborative and flexible process for determining the validity
or lack thereof of colonial-era territorial claims by spatially distant
powers would serve several important functions. (1) First, it would
either eliminate or simplify a number of legal claims, especially those
claiming discovery of terra nullius, that are extremely difficult to
prove legally and face even more difficulty obtaining legitimacy in the
eyes of rival claimants. (2) Secondly, its collaborative format would
suggest (without imposing) the shape of further legal processes by
means of which COI parties could gradually seek to arbitrate the
issue of territorial sovereignty. (3) Lastly, as a referendum by
regional powers on the political facts and legal status of colonial
incursions into the region, it would serve the important role of a
common regional recognition of what Simon Schama has referred to
as (in the context of the Spanish conquest of the Netherlands) "a cut
with the past which [] made possible the retrospective invention of a
collective identity."20 7 It would, in terms of this last function, make a
modest contribution towards defining modern "Asia" as a selfconstituting region whose geopolitics need not be determined by
colonial political legacies.
With regards to the first function, a finding that French and
Japanese territorial claims based on the discovery of terra nullius
were invalid-because, for example, the territories had long been
used and occupied by various East Asian states, which had at
minimum "inchoate claims" to the South China Sea's various
islands-would pave the way for the more general rejection of the
rhetoric of discovery-based sovereignty claims in the region. 208 By
articulating a set of normative guidelines as to when and how a claim
of discovery can be successfully asserted, the COI would at best
discourage claimant states from pursuing such claims (thus turning
instead to alternatives with better-developed sets of legal criteria,
such as claims based on formally sufficient territorial cession and the
self-conscious political bargaining by interested states that
accompanies such activity) or, failing that, at least apply equal

SIMON ScHAMA, THE EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES: AN INTERPRETATION OF
207.
DUTCH CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE 113 (1987).

208.
This effect would, thus, be consistent with the normative proposals outlined
in HAYTON, supra note 76; Mirski, supra note 30; or Kingdon, supra note 13, without,
however, depending upon political or diplomatic commitments by the United States, or
any other outside power, to intervene in the situation by supporting or deterring
adjudication of any state's legal claims. Clarification of the claims themselves could
work towards a similar goal.
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pressure to all states still hoping to make discovery-based claims to
sovereignty to further specify and clarify 20 9 the legal and factual
basis for such claims.
On the other hand, a finding that French or Japanese "discovery"
claims were at one time valid (though this may be unlikely given the
factors already noted) would also, ironically, serve the same beneficial
goals of ruling out any contemporary claimants from making such
discovery-based claims. Neither France nor Japan now claim the
territories, and indeed both have at various times made clear
indications that they no longer maintain any claim whatsoever to the
territories. 2 10 As a result of a finding that one or both of them once
had sovereignty over the territory, however, today's contestants for
South China Sea territorial sovereignty would be placed in the
position of arguing their own claims solely on the basis of positivistic
assignations of legal rights after the date of "discovery" by one or the
other colonial power.
The only exception to this elimination of discovery as a viable
legal argument would be the stance that, at some specific date,
France or Japan had territorial sovereignty over the disputed areas
and then affirmatively renounced that ownership, without assigning
a successor (a claim currently pursued by the Philippines, but in fact
likely available to all powers currently occupying South China Sea
territories). 2 11 While this argument would still be available, and thus
the idea of a post-1945 "discovery" of the territory could still be
argued in arbitration, pursuit of such a claim pointing to this later
date of effectivity would be far easier to adjudicate, given the
increased amount of modern sources of evidence and the welldeveloped record of legal and diplomatic claims and statements made
by various states on the issue. This one remaining discovery-based
argument would not pose the same kind of problems present when all
claimant states have such incommensurable politico-legal claims
rooted in their interpretations of ancient historical sources and
cultural practices.
Relatedly, per the second function, the elimination or further
specification of discovery-based claims, and the concomitant elevation
of alternative claims based on territorial cession, would allow for

209.
This process of "clarification", of course, would be precisely what the
Philippines and other states have requested of China vis-A-vis its U-shaped line claim.
The UNCLOS arbitration is, however, a poor vehicle for achieving such clarification,
for the reasons noted in Parts II and III of this Article. By contrast, the COI proposed
in this Article would start based on the premise that all states have poorly defined
territorial claims based on the concept of "discovery", in part based on the legal
ambiguity of that concept itself. It is only by joining together to further clarify a shared
basis for such claims that each individual claim can be more clearly stated-or
abandoned-in favor of other, more legally developed claims.
210.
Cf. SAMUELS, supra note 149.
211.
Id.
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states to more easily envision potential legal processes for the
resolution of the dispute. By first going through the COI process in
order to determine the validity of French and Japanese assertions of
discovery, the currently involved states would, without risking the
availability of their own ultimate claims to sovereignty, establish a
shared basis for the common pursuit of an ultimate legal resolution to
the dispute. At the conclusion of the COI process (in one of the two
outcomes noted above), involved states would have the options of (1)
seeking to collaborate further in continuing the mechanism to
determine other issues; (2) seeking instead to establish an arbitration
or other adjudication mechanism for determination of current
sovereignty claims; or (3) withdrawing from the collaborative process.
None of these three options would negate the stabilization bonus
to the region from the collective pursuit of the COI, as well as the
specifying and defining effect on legal claims that would also be
produced. The first two options would, indeed, allow states to pursue
further specification of claims and would tend towards greater
likelihood of ultimate resolution of the dispute on the basis of shared
legal norms in a process viewed as fair and legitimate. Even if one or
more involved states turned instead to the third option, their
withdrawal would not mitigate the existing benefits of collaborative
inquiry up to that point, and the corresponding degree to which they
further specified and clarified their legal claims would have a
salutary effect on both the geopolitical and legal dimensions of the
dispute.
The third function of the COI, however, is likely the most
important of all, as it most reflects the diverse politico-legal and
historical meanings that would be associated with collaborative
international processes of this scope and importance established at a
regional level by East Asian states. 2 12 In keeping with the role of
international law as a system of normative concepts and practices
that promote cooperative behavior between nations, seeking to
diminish self-interested competition over the acquisition of exclusive
benefits, a COI enabling (some degree of) consensus and
condominium on the issue of territorial sovereignty would further the
goals of regional cooperation and the establishment of long-term
norms for mutual recognition within the system of equal sovereign
states. Yet they would also avoid compromising the coexistent (if
sometimes conflicting) 2 13 development of customary international

212.
See Richard Stubbs, ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian
Regionalism?, 42 ASIAN SURVEY 440 (2002).
Conflict between the two principles of sovereign equality and the equal
213.
cosmopolitan rights of all human individuals arises despite the closely-linked
intellectual origins of both ideals. They can be normatively reconciled by reference to
their shared origins in a more basic stance of "egalitarian universalism." See Cohen,
supra note 158 ("Sovereign equality and human rights are both new and indispensable
principles; in international relations, both are based on what Jurigen Habermas has
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norms based upon the modern humanitarian ideal of equal rights for
all individual people, regardless of state affiliation. A COI would not
immediately realize either of these ideal legal conditions, but would
promote them jointly and separately.
Building upon the North Korean human rights example, the
repeated successful deployment of a COI in the East Asia regional
context would be the grounds for further inquiry as to the unique
benefits of this institutional mechanism for regional international
relations, including potential future uses in the sphere of human
rights inquiries. Arguably, COIs are institutions particularly welladapted to collaboration among East Asian states, whose shared legal
traditions and historically Confucian political and cultural practices
favor inquisitorial, rather than adversarial, methods of adjudication,
and where the objects of judicial inquisition were generally defined in
an initially expansive, but gradually narrowing manner permitting
2 14
extensive ongoing consultations among parties.
Of course, any new institutional development related to the
South China Sea will also necessarily implicate the long-term project
of peaceful regional integration: as with any concrete instance of
rights discourse, the articulated public reasoning of a COI for the
South China Sea would also be just one "iteration" of the underlying
project of international rights-based ordering as such. 2 15 To what
extent can particularized legal discourse, over a highly specific legal
dispute, contribute to or detract from the longer-term effort to
establish a stable and ever-deepening modus vivendi framework
among regional actors? 2 16 The following Part will explore possible
approaches to this question.

called egalitarian universalism, and they can become complementary if the attempt is
made in good faith to make new distinctions and update the rules of the international
legal order accordingly. As opposed to imperial universalism, which perceives the world
from the centralizing perspective of its own worldview (hoping to impose its version of
global right), egalitarian universalism demands that even superpowers relativize their
particular interpretations of general principles vis-A-vis the interpretive perspectives of
equally situated and equally entitled agents."); see also Jtirgen Habermas, Interpreting
the Fall of a Monument, 10 CONSTELLATIONS 364 (Sept. 2003).
214.
Ryan Mitchell, Collective Inquiry and the Juridical Logic of Abduction
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
215.
Cf. discussion of the "iteration" of rights in various concrete contexts in
Seyla Benhabib, Defending a Cosmopolitanism Without Illusions: Reply to My Critics,
17 CRITICAL REV. INT'L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 697 (2014).
216.
For a parallel discourse related to the role of international law in intraEuropean cooperation and integration see, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE LAW IN
POLITICAL INTEGRATION: THE EVOLUTION AND INTEGRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL
LEGAL PROCESSES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1971).
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V. COLLECTIVE INQUIRY AND THE PROJECT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

A. Sovereignty, Normativity, and Realism in InternationalLaw
International legal discourse takes place by means of specific
cooperative institutions, and the successful functioning of these
institutions depends largely on the degree to which they are accepted
by the states that compose them. 217 As states seemingly remain the
fundamental units of international order, new projects in
international law must take the theorization of the relationship
between and among states, and the attempted prediction of their
behavior, 218 as important normative referents (even where the
desired goal is to change such behavior). 2 19 Yet this is not just a
practical exigency of global political realities; it is key to the
theoretical origins of international law as such, as well as to its a
2 20
priori possibilities and limitations.
The modern liberal project of international law of which
UNCLOS, and the law of the sea in general, are such successful
examples has in large part developed as both the evolution of and a
reaction against the Westphalian system of formally equal sovereigns
defined by their territorial exclusivity. This dualistic relationship was
perhaps most explicitly and influentially summed up by Kant in his
essay on Perpetual Peace, where he writes that "a state of peace,
therefore, must be established ...and unless this security is pledged
to each by his neighbor (a thing that can occur only in a civil state),

217.
This idea is often articulated in the context of critical perspectives on
international law, see, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 202 (2005) ("[International law is] a special kind of politics"
which is "binding and robust, but only when it is rational for states to comply with it."),
but it is also frequently recognized as, at minimum, an important pragmatic challenge
for those advocating a more "binding and robust" international legal framework. See,
e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003).
Edward T. Swaine, InternationalLaw Is, as InternationalRelations Theory
218.
Does, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 258 (2006) (citing FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLITICS (Oona Anne Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005)) ("[While
international legal theories might not scientifically establish valid causal relationships,
they can suggest documented and plausible correlations or outcomes.").
See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB.
219.
AFF. 113 (2005).
See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law:
220.
Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New
International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 1 (2000) (describing the role of popular
sovereignty in delimiting the conceptual possibilities of state behavior, and arguing
that it serves as an a prioriconstraint on international projects).
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each may treat his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as
22 1
an enemy."
For Kant, the development of international law, as well as the
basis of its binding force, originates in the human predilection for
sociability. 222 The'formal legal principle of exclusive territorial
control, though central to the Westphalian system (and the ultimate
basis of all assertions of rights and injuries under that system) that
Kant affirmed, was at its very core compromised by an underlying
tension with the generative propensity for seeking out new forms of
social organization and interaction. The logical ideal (if perhaps
asymptotic) endpoint of this ongoing process of sociability has been
the achievement of "perpetual peace" in a foedus pacificum, or
federation of free republics in a stable and law-governed international
2 23
order.
Today's attempts to resolve or prevent international conflicts by
means of treaties, conferences, arbitration, and other such
multilateral institutions largely follow in this idealist tradition. The
core of this tradition, with respect to international order, is a belief
"inreason and the possibility of progress in interstate relationships,"
wherein "[t]he individual person is the repository of moral value [and]
human beings should be treated as ends, rather than means." 224 As
noted, Kant has been regarded as a founding figure of the modern
liberal worldview due to, inter alia, his appeal to the "kingdom of
ends" as a regulatory principle of all human behavior. 225 Yet the
basic philosophical foundations, as well as real-world praxis, of the
liberal project of international ordering go back considerably further.
Despite the important prehistory of many of its key concepts in
the humanistic writings of the Renaissance and late medieval era
(and in the classical schools of thought informing these works), 22 6 a
specifically "liberal" idealist perspective on international legal and
political order is often seen as originating in the systematic writings
of the "father of [modern] international law," Hugo Grotius. 227
Grotius exemplifies the argument from universal practices approach
to natural law characterizing the early Enlightenment. 2 28 He sought

221.
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795)
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kantl.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y8YS-8K87]
(archived Feb. 15, 2016).
222.
See IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1798) (discussing "the highest end intended for man,
namely, sociability [Geselligkeit].").

223.

KANT,

supra note 221.

224.
Swaine, supra note 218; see also JENS TiMMERMANN, KANT'S GROUNDWORK
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS: A COMMENTARY (2007).
225.
Id.
226.

See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1-16 (2001).

227.
228.

Id.
Id.
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to define the applicable international law of his era as a set of
customary practices, susceptible to modification by future behavior.
This influentially open-ended, sociability-based model arguably
inaugurated modern international law and made possible the more
Specifically delineated teleological visions of Kant and other
2 29
subsequent theorists.
Against this basic disposition (which can be further subdivided
into such variants as classical liberalism, cosmopolitanism,
utilitarianism, neoliberalism, etc.), there has often been opposed an
alternate strain of reflection on international order, commonly
referred to as realism. Though attempts have been made to chart a
general intellectual genealogy of realist approaches to politics and
international relations, 230 the very nature of the theoretical position
to be thus studied complicates an overly historicized definition. In
essence, realist approaches to international relations and to
international law are characterized by skepticism as to the practical
real-world relevance of ideological content, whether these are
metaphysical beliefs, ethical standards, or purportedly universal legal
or political norms, in comparison with concrete, particular
23 1
situations.
While advocates of the liberal (sometimes equated with or
subordinated to a more generally-defined "idealist") approach can
plausibly trace much of their conceptual vocabulary and practical
telos to the Grotian (or, again, earlier, humanist) project of
systematizing and rationalizing the international order, international
realists tend to turn to Thomas Hobbes as one of the first great
exponents of their own critical perspective on legal ordering of the
2 32
international sphere.
Hobbes raised, inter alia, the skeptical point that universal
practice alone does not determine the right in particular situations,
and thus cannot be independently sufficient for the full determination
of the rights and obligations of states. 233 Based on his conception of
political sovereignty, the state of nature, and the legal structure of
the contract, he made consent the rational basis of all legal
obligation. 234 His contractarian ideas, against the largely
unmitigated Grotian focus on custom, became another key element of
international law. 2 35 It is important to note that even avowedly

Id.
229.
See, e.g., Steven Forde, Classical Realism, in 17 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN
230.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 62 (Terry Nardin &
David R. Mapel eds., 1992).
Id.
231.
232.
Id.
Id. at 75-77.
233.
Id.
234.
235.
See TUCK, supra note 226. In fact, Grotius also incorporated contractarian
notions into his own framework, particularly in relation to the practice and
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realist (or "naturalist") followers of Hobbes, however, have extremely
varying views as to the exact functioning and scope of states'
contracting power. For some, such as Samuel von Pufendorf,
contractarianism can have results that look quite a bit like Grotius'
23 6
system of universal practices.
Nonetheless, the essential liberal idealist/realist split has in
significant part persisted to the present, with modern realist skeptics
of international legal authority generally raising the point that only
by official action can states clearly produce new binding obligations.
One especially influential articulation of this critical perspective in
the context of modern international law has been Carl Schmitt's
appeal to the traditional basis of the law of nations on relations
between magni homines, or "great people": the notion that states are
independent entities that interact with one another as concrete
personalities, as opposed to the mere accumulation of their individual
2 37
citizens.
For Schmitt, the Kantian vision of a legally institutionalized,
necessarily peaceful liberal order relying on supra-state authority
revealed the earlier thinker's "greatness and humanity" but also
revealed that "he was ...

closer to theologians than to jurists."2 38 The

assertion of any moral authority binding upon states, but not based
on their own express consent (at least in terms of the initial allocation
of supervisory authority to the external supervisory body), would be
presumptively invalid. By contrast, the great achievement of the jus
publicum Europaeum (European public law), which was to "bracket
war," was accomplished only by means of empowering the magni
homines/Westphalian sovereign equals to wage formally-declared
legal war upon one another to vindicate perceived wrongs. 23 9 By
contrast, liberal projects such as outlawing war while retaining
independent sovereign equality could not succeed in an anarchic
world.
It is important to note, though, that Schmitt's criticism of Kant
in this regard is articulated not as a substantive disagreement over
goals, but rather as a matter of conceptual consistency. His remark
that the goal of a peaceful federation banning aggressive war is a

justifications of warfare between sovereigns. Nonetheless, his basic assumption was
that contract-based conceptions of rights were, when legitimate, ultimately justifiable
based on universal custom. By contrast, for followers of Hobbes, customary practices
were only ultimately justifiable based on contract. Though views as to the justifiability
of particular rights claims or practices might, thus, correlate, they came from
fundamentally opposed basic theoretical backgrounds. Cf. Stephen C. Neff, A Short
History of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 2 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2nd ed.
2006) (discussing the growth and changes in international law from the middle ages to
post-WWII).
236.
See, e.g., Neff, supra note 235, at 10.
237.
SCHMITT, supra note 132, at 143.
238.
Id. at 170-71.
239.
Id. at 246.
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"theological" rather than a "juridical" one was based on his view that
this goal was simply incompatible with the notion of magni hominesstyle, formally equal Westphalian sovereignty, upon which Kant also
explicitly relied. 240 In the exceptional case, Schmitt argued, the
sovereignty-bearing unit (i.e., the Westphalian state) would retain
24 1
the ultimate veto over any external norm.
Whereas Kant might thus be read as supporting the idea of a
"universally" binding legal standard for maritime sovereignty, as
embodied in UNCLOS (which has been described as a "Constitution
for the Ocean"), Schmitt stands for the firmly opposed position that
no "constitution" could possibly serve as an ultimate normative
authority separate from that of the individual states that decide
whether or not to consent to it. Rather like today's Chinese position,
Schmitt argues that the only "constitutions" that can meaningfully be
legally binding are those produced by the political decision of a
sovereign (popular or otherwise). For him, as for today's China, the
question of assigning sovereign control over territory is conceptually
prior to any discussion of the legal norms applicable in that
territory.242
Many of today's Western international law and international
relations realists do not go as far as Schmitt in the scope of their
critique. 243 Yet for precisely this reason his far-spectrum view can
serve as a valuable argumentative reference point. Indeed, his
defense of a political "pluriverse" continues to draw attention in
academic communities throughout the world today, in a way that
more modest critical positions do not often accomplish. 24 4 Attempts to

240.
Id. at 147-167.
241.
See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, 35 (University of
Chicago Press, 2007) ("War is still today the most extreme possibility. One can say that
the exceptional case has an especially decisive meaning which exposes the core of the
matter.").
242.
Id. at 46 ("The endeavor of a normal state consists above all in assuring
total peace within the state and its territory. To create tranquility, security, and order
and thereby establish the normal situation is the prerequisite for legal norms to be
valid.").
And, conversely, today's liberal thinkers tend to accept some variant of the
243.
realist position of international anarchy as the baseline for their further normative
agendas intended to mitigate the negative effects of that anarchic state. See, e.g.,
Swaine, supra note 218, at 254 ("Neoliberals contend that, while the interstate system
does function in anarchic conditions, that situation does not, in itself, cripple
opportunities for instigating durable patterns of cooperation. Such patterns can be set
by creating international regimes that coordinate ways and means agreed upon to
handle common transnational problems. Regimes facilitate cooperation and
collaboration among governments in that they elucidate norms, universalize rules,
enhance information sharing, reinforce reciprocity, and provide methods for punishing
those who deviate from acceptable conduct.").
244.
Cf. Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt's Warning on the Dangers of a Unipolar
World, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THOUGHT OF CARL SCHMITT: TERROR,
LIBERAL WAR AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL ORDER 147 (2007).
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realize new 'liberal" projects of international law, such as the
entrenchment of the UNCLOS regime's universalized rule apparatus
in the face of competing sovereignty claims, should not ignore
Schmittian, sovereignty-based criticisms, but rather fully address
24 5
them.
In the attempt to better articulate the relationship between this
acknowledgment of the critical ideal of sovereignty and the specific
international legal innovation proposed in this Article, it is necessary
to refer to other important approaches to the explanation of
international legal and political order, in addition to the basic
liberal/realist antinomy. One important, "constructivist," approach
adopts core realist insights regarding international anarchy, while
asserting that the self-understanding of states within that orderand the way that they subsequently interact and define their
24 6
respective goals and interests-are largely "socially constructed.
That is, states' "conduct stems from the way in which [they] perceive
the outside world. It is their expressions of those perceptions that set
the course for state actions." 2 47 Yet, as will be seen in the following
subpart, one need not fully subscribe to this constructivist worldview
to appreciate the relevance of its core insights to the specific
theoretical dimensions of the problem and proposed solution under
consideration in this Article: the establishment of a legal mechanism
to facilitate the cooperative transnational discourse of the parties in
dispute over the South China Sea.
B. ConstitutingMutual Recognition in the South China Sea
As noted in the previous subpart, the core constructivist insight
into international relations is, essentially, that the way states define
their interests and objectives is not predetermined, but rather arises
in the discursive context of contemporary international society and is
informed by various contingent factors, both domestic and external.
As a result, the condition of anarchy that realists identify between
independent sovereigns-the lack of an overarching governing body

245.
Of course, many important attempts have been made, at varying levels of
argumentative scope and with varying argumentative strategies. See, e.g., Jfirgen
Habermas, The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation
Problems of a Constitutionfor World Society, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 444, 445 (2008) ("If
the advocates of a constitutionalization of international law are not to write off
democracy completely, they must develop at least models for an institutional
arrangement that can secure a democratic legitimation for new forms of governance in
transnational spaces. Even without the backing of state sovereignty, the arrangement
sought for must connect up with the existing, though inadequate, modes of legitimation
of the constitutional state, while at the same time supplementing them with its own
contributions to legitimation.").
246.
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of PowerPolitics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391, 396 (1992).
247.
Swaine, supra note 218, at 255; see also Wendt, supra note 246, at 411.
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or other such authority-is ultimately largely "what states make of
it. '' 248 Redefinition of self, or mutual understandings, can similarly
redefine the possibilities of state cooperation. Discourse can redefine
the actors who participate in it.
This is often regarded as a very modern theoretical framework,
indebted to the works of contemporary philosophers and political
theorists, among others, on the discursive conditioning of
subjectivity. 2 49 Yet the basic constructivist insight summarized above
can also be read in a broader sense to simply stand for the openended nature of cooperative state behavior as mediated through the
process of interaction on the trans- and international level: a concept
that is arguably fully reconcilable with a "realist" emphasis on state
interests. The related concept of an interest in recognition by and
among states has increasingly emerged as an explanatory factor for
state behavior, 250 in addition to its more widely recognized role in the
non-contractarian justification of political authority on a domestic
25 1
level.
As construed in these scholarly discourses, recognition largely
2 52
derives its conceptual content from the works of G. W. F. Hegel.
Though he was very cautious in his own explicit treatment of
international law (to the extent that he has been perceived as
regressive in comparison with Kant's more hopeful approach), Hegel
in fact articulated a new intellectual approach to deepen the
understanding of international legal ordering. His specific comments
on international law often seem to straddle the divide between
Grotian liberal universalism and Hobbesian skeptical realism. As he
notes in his Philosophy of Right, "relations between states ... depend
principally upon the customs of nations, customs being the inner
universality of behavior maintained in all circumstances." 253 Such an
understanding seems at least initially to support the Grotian, and
later Kantian, premise that states may, by altering their behavior,

248.
Wendt, supra note 246, at 391.
249.
Cf. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The
Constructivist Research Program in InternationalRelations and Comparative Politics,
4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 391, 398 (2001).
250.
See, e.g., Hans Agne, Jens Bartelson, Eva Erman, Thomas Lindemann,
Benjamin Herborth, Oliver Kessler, Christine Chwaszcza, Mikulas Fabry, and Stephen
D. Krasner. Symposium: TIhe Politics of International Recognition', 5 INTERNATIONAL
THEORY 1, 94-107 (2013); see also, e.g. Jost DelbrUck, Structural Changes in the
International System and Its Legal Order: International Law in the Era of
Globalization, 11 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR INTERNATIONALES UND
EUROPAISCHES RECHT 1 (2001).
251.
See, e.g., ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, HEGEL'S ETHICS OF RECOGNITION
(University of California Press, 1998); AXEL HONNETH, THE PATHOLOGIES OF
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: HEGEL'S SOCIAL THEORY (Ladislaus Lbb trans., 2010).
252.
Id.
253.
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL & ALLEN W. WOOD, ELEMENTS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 371, § 339 (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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create new and even potentially unlimited legal frameworks for
projects of collective ordering (perhaps even a Constitution for the
Ocean). Yet, at the same time, Hegel also made clear his agreement
with the opposing, Hobbesian premise that, as "[t]here is no Praetor
to judge between states, at best there may be an arbitrator or a
mediator, and even he exercises his functions contingently only, i.e. in
2 54
dependence on the particularwills of the disputants."
The appearance of an inconsistency between the views of
international law expressed in these two quotations is reconcilable
only by attention to two concepts that Hegel made central to his
philosophical oeuvre: "customs," or Sitte, and the aforementioned
recognition. As Erik Ringmar writes, rather than focusing on
international law's liberal ideals, or on the political struggles that
complicate realization of those ideals, "Hegel would stress [that] law
provides us not only with a means of adjudicating between right and
wrong, but also with a way through which identities can be
established, recognized, and developed. ''2 55 The role of international
law in defining state-to-state relations, in other words, is largely
centered on the way in which, "by our submitting our actions to the
stipulations of the law, others can come to recognize us as persons, or
'25 6
states, of a certain kind.
More generally, recognition for Hegel was the conscious goal of
intersubjectively validated status attainment, within a given
community of similarly acknowledged peers. 25 7 Crucially, such a
community could only be construed on the basis of some shared
concept of customary and ethical life, or Sittlichkeit,258 to replace a
pre-existing state of potentially violent anarchy. Without having to
subscribe to a fully constructivist interpretation of interstate
relations, it is possible to see in states' pursuit of mutual recognition
a genuine (realism-consistent) "interest" that can give rise to both
cooperative and competitive behavioral patterns, but which
ultimately favors a state's interest in community-building for the
purposes of entrenching the recognition of its favored norms, as well
as its own relative status vis-a-vis its peers. Unlike more
comprehensive liberal or constructivist theories, such a Hegelianmodified realist view requires only that states' "interest" be
broadened to accommodate concerns of status and recognition-but
can also imply the possibility for extensive cooperation.

254.
Id. at 368, § 333 (emphasis added).
255.
Ringmar, supra note 21, at 102. Though, as Ringmar acknowledges, in
most of his discussions of these subjects, Hegel refers to them in the context of social
relations between individual persons, he leaves open the scope of their potential impact
on interstate relations.
Id.
256.
HEGEL & WOOD, supra note 253, at xix.
257.
258.
Id. at 189, § 142.
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Yet the application of this theoretical approach-or indeed, any
other-is rendered difficult by the practical dynamics of the South
China Sea dispute. Above all, the current situation in which states
are experiencing a "dissensus" regarding the proper legal issues to
consider first in addressing their conflicts-the law of sovereignty
versus the law of the sea-has resulted in a situation where, at least
with respect to the disputed territories, states may not even be in a
relationship of "anarchy" with one another. For anarchy to exist as
traditionally conceived, after all, there must at least be recognition of
the potentially legitimate presence of another entity (even Kant
begins his account of peaceful cooperation with the need to establish
mutual trust between neighboring states). The key problem with
regards to the South China Sea is that all of the claimants deny any
possible right for the others to be present in what they regard as their
own sovereign territory, yet, at the same time, advance solipsistic
arguments in favor of their own presence that seemingly do nothing
to persuade (or imply any recognition of) their fellow claimants.
To put it another way, it is premature to discuss either liberal or
constructivist solutions to the sovereignty dispute at a moment when
the states involved in the dispute have yet to even begin any
constructive discourse on the issue. Moreover, as this Article has
argued, the current international arbitration between the Philippines
and China suffers from the weakness of ignoring the very issue that
is at the center of the dispute. It may thus even exacerbate the lack of
discourse and mutual recognition among claimants. As long as this
radical lack of discourse continues to characterize the issue of
sovereign ownership over the disputed territories, all claimants will
remain in a state of mutual fear and epistemic uncertainty regarding
the potential for their competitors to suddenly "militarize" and
escalate the dispute in the service of one or another of their unheard
arguments. It is in this sense that a COI refocusing ongoing
international law efforts from "the law of the sea" to the "law of
sovereignty" can serve to dissuade, rather than encourage,
militarization or aggression.
The idea that political sovereignty, by. clearing up "epistemic
uncertainty" can remove incentives to violence based on mutual fear
and suspicion is, in fact, at the very heart of the "realist" tradition of
political theory. At the same time, the idea of a positive project of
using sovereignty to clear up such uncertainty suggests the
possibility of more liberal or constructivist evolutionary dynamics in
interstate relations. David Grewal, for instance, has recently argued
that certain "dimensions of Hobbes's thought []reveal him as .. .
more [a] 'constructivist' than 'realist.' 259 In particular, Hobbes
sought to draw a connection between the successful establishment of

259.
David Singh Grewal, The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on
InternationalOrder, 125 Yale L.J. 618 (2016).
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a "well-ordered commonwealth" and a more expansive path "to
260
achieve a pacific order among potentially bellicose modern states."
A properly-ordered civil state, free of control by internal factions and
representing the increasingly rational and globalized (commercial)
interests of its constituents, would constitute an essential building
2 61
block for what Grewal refers to as a "realist-utopian" world order.
Like Hegel, Hobbes incorporates key realist insights-indeed, he
is as noted regarded as the founder of this tradition in international
thought-yet nonetheless suggests the possibility of increasing
progress towards the ultimate goal of a peaceful, liberal international
order. Ultimately, however, the subject of recognition in his view was
not the state as such, but rather the state only within the scope of,
and to the extent to which it had, a formally recognizable claim of
right, or ius, that was capable of vindication in a generally recognized
process of legitimate adjudication (at the time such processes
2 62
included the use of war to prosecute legal claims).
Thus, Hobbes wrote, "They say that Justice is the constant Will
of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no Own,
that is, no Propriety [property], there is no Injustice." 2 63 Hobbes
seemingly viewed the assertion of self-interested, but mutually
recognizable, claims to the violation of rights (ius)2 6 4 as the core of an
effective international order. 2 65 Like Grotius and Kant, he appeared
to view globalizing integration as an inherent element of gradually
expanding "commercial republics." 2 66 And yet, like Hegel, he clearly
recognized the positivist point that no ultimate third-party, objective
body could be wished into being to rule the community of states from
above; rather, any achievements in the dimension of increasing
international solidarity and peaceful integration would first have to
be accomplished in the sphere of discursively constructed Sitte, or
custom (for Hobbes, the civil sphere). The integrating, cosmopolitan
telos of this sphere was not opposed to the Westphalian sovereign
267
state system, but rather dependent upon and constituted by it.
Ultimately, all of these foundational views, together and
separately, support the increased mobilization of noncoercive
international legal mechanisms to help establish what have been
referred to in constructivist theory as "epistemic communities." 2 68 In

260.
Id. at 624 (citing COMMERCE AND PERPETUAL PEACE IN ENLIGHTENMENT
THOUGHT (B6la Kapossy et al. eds., 2016)).
261.
Id. at 634.
262.
See, e.g., TUCK, supra note 226, at 119.
263.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 110 (1660).

264.
Id.
265.
See TUCK, supra note 226, at 96, 132.
See id. at 276.
266.
Id.
267.
268.
See generally Mai'a K. Davis Cross, Rethinking Epistemic Communities
Twenty Years Later, 39 REV. INT'L STUD. 137, 137 (2013) (discussing the formation and
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brief, such communities take the form of "a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge," 26 9 and they
have played an important role in regional and global integration
projects by, inter alia, "persuad[ing] [regional state] actors to conform
to consensual (i.e., intersubjectively constructed) ideas without
recourse to more material forms of power." 2 70 At the same time,
placing the core "realist" problem of allocating sovereignty (at least
partially) into the hands of the transnational epistemic community of
a COI would constitute de facto mutual recognition by participating
states of the equal legal status and right to procedural fairness of
their fellow claimants.
In the context of the South China Sea dispute, the current lack of
mutual recognition among disputants as to the right of other states to
even articulate claims over the core issue in dispute-the issue of
territorial ownership-and thus the corresponding lack of recognition
of other states' legal statuses as equally-situated disputants entitled
to procedural fairness (potential holders of a Hobbesian ius) impedes
the gradual development of integrated regional institutions and a
common sphere of discourse and collective practical ethics/Sitte to
strengthen the foundations of regional cooperation.
As has been the case with Western Europe and Latin America,
for example, the further development of regional institutions and
norms is inseparable from adoption of and participation in mutuallyaccepted dispute resolution mechanisms, whether primarily legal or
diplomatic in nature. 2 7 1 As argued in Parts III and IV of this Article,
a COI for the South China Sea raises the possibility of creating a
legal, and thus positivist, problem in place of what is now an
essentially metaphysical one (regarding the "emptiness" of territories
or the "existence" of sovereignty at given points in history). In the
theoretical terms advocated by this Article, we would have to
characterize as a paradigmatic shift in regional customary practice,
or Sittlichkeit, a communal decision by interested states to replace a
divisive metaphysical dispute denying recognition (a dispute over who
operations of epistemic communities). Note that Grewal, supra note 259, at 631,
asserts that Hobbes was not enough of a constructivist to believe that the creation of
"'epistemic communities' would overcome the problems of anarchy among states
without a transformation of domestic society." However the argument outlined in this
Article does not go that far; rather, I suggest that a "realist-utopian" agenda like that
of Hobbes requires states to enter into discourse and establish "epistemic communities"
simply to open up possibilities for various forms of further interaction and cooperation.
In other words, as stated elsewhere in this Part, the current dynamic of mutually
ignoring sovereignty claims while simultaneously pursuing law of the sea disputes and
military escalation leaves states even worse off than they would be in a purely
"Hobbesian" state of open anarchic competition.
Cross, supra note 268, at 142.
269.
270.
Anthony Zito, Epistemic Communities, Collective Entrepreneurship and
European Integration, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POLY 585 (2001).
271.
See id.
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"discovered" whom) with a positive legal question implying
recognition (the question of how diplomatic statements or legal
instruments can be evaluated to determine, to whatever degree
possible, which state has the most persuasive claim to ownership of
particular island territories as recognized by other, equal polities).
C. Collective Inquiry, Epistemic Community, and Asian Order
As noted in Part III.C., the "discovery" paradigm of territorial
acquisition is closely bound up with the distinctly European,
Enlightenment-era conception of positive imposition of legal control
over "savage" territory by the representatives of civilized, scientific
rationality. Applying this conceptual framework to the territorial
disputes between today's East Asian states only serves to exacerbate
nationalist tensions and narratives of cultural primacy or
superiority. 272 By contrast, a successful multilateral legal institution
should enable the involved states to participate on an equal basis in a
joint production of legal knowledge: bolstering the various states'
shared "knowledge-based network" of legal professionals. 273
In place of ideologically or emotionally determined arguments
regarding discovery or "sacred territory," a COI would refocus
discourse on the technical questions of sovereign ownership via
official legal title (especially as demonstrated by potential acts or
statements of cession). As developed in Part IV, this discursive
transformation would, if successful, greatly increase the scope of
common ground among disputants and dissuade unilateral political
or even military action to enforce claims should there be no prospect
of an outlet for such enforcement in international law. The network of
international legal professionals that would take part in the process
of establishing and executing a COI, moreover, is one that already
exists. China, in particular, has experienced a rapid growth in the
quantity and professionalization of its class of lawyers. 2 74 At this
point, all South China Sea disputants already have robust
communities of international lawyers, including many already
275
writing voluminously about this very topic.
Crucially, however, each disputant state's legal community tends
to write about this dispute more or less from the perspective of its

272.
See discussion supra Part III. C.
273.
See MA'A K. DAVIS CROSS, SECURITY INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: How
KNOWLEDGE-BASED NETWORKS ARE TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN UNION 1-6 (2011).
274.
See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, WILLIAM KIRBY & KENNETH WINSTON,
PROSPECTS FOR THE PROFESSIONS IN CHINA: PART I PROFESSIONS IN THE LAW
(Routledge, 2010).
275.
In addition to the various authors cited throughout this Article, significant
amounts of writing on South China Sea issues have been produced by individual
scholars, official and semi-official institutes, committees, and research groups
throughout the region.
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own state's articulated claims and positions. Indeed, the reality is
that often knowing an author's national origin (including those from
the United States or other Western countries) enables accurate
prediction of the substantive conclusions reached by her or his
ensuing legal analysis; in large part, as developed throughout this
Article, the legal questions and body of law that authors choose to
examine is often based on the decision they would like to reach, which
in turn is based on perceived state interests.
If, instead, the legal communities in each disputant state were to
play a more determinative role in the resolution of this international
dispute-because they would be actively involved in creating and
operating a mechanism to determine the basic facts about territorial
sovereignty that would then be used in each state's subsequent legal
arguments-this would enable the establishment of a shared dialogue
among skilled legal professionals. Because they would not be called
upon to articulate arguments as to the ultimate sovereign ownership
of the disputed territory, international lawyers involved in the COI
would be more free to represent their own state's interest while still
fully engaging with their foreign colleagues in the techn of legal
inquiry. Ultimately, the formation of a transnational community of
inquirers 276 to begin addressing the aporiae of South China Sea
territorial claims is a first step in redirecting conversations over
territory from the politically volatile, totalizing realm of
"metaphysical universalism" (e.g., ideas of ancient, sacred heritage or
of discovery and territorial "emptiness") to that of "a discursive,
277
communicative concept of rationality."
The transition from modes of interaction conducted via claims
based in metaphysical universalism to those based in discursive
rationality is, in fact, the most urgent task facing the region as a
whole. Part of the European colonial legacy in modern Asia is that a
region historically characterized by a high degree of diversity,
pluralism, and graduated borders has now been fully incorporated
into the Westphalian paradigm of exclusive "national" affiliations and
positivistically-defined rights and duties both for states and for their
citizens. 2 78 In the face of these alienated conceptions of political

See Ashforth supra note 18 (advancing a related understanding of COIs).
276.
SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY, AND
277.
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 5 (1992) ("It is the discourse of the
community of inquirers (Charles Sanders Peirce) which first assigns an evidential or
other type of value to aspects of our consciousness or experience, and brings them into
play as factors which support our claims to the veracity of our beliefs. In the continuing
and potentially unending discourse of the community of inquiry there are no 'givens,'
there only those aspects of consciousness and reality which at any point in time may
enter into our deliberations as evidence and which we find cogent in backing our
statements. The first step then in the formulation of a post- metaphysical universalist
position is to shift from a substantialistic to a discursive, communicative concept of
rationality.").
278.
For one view of this process, see Coleman & Maogoto, supra note 75.
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identity, there is a constant threat of the development of "forms of
self-enclosed nationalism or religious fundamentalism ... founded on
the exclusion of the other." 279 As discussed above in Part III, the
mutually compatible notions of both "discovery" and "sacred territory"
are easily assimilated to precisely such nationalist and totalizing
narratives. In fact, to a large extent, the rhetoric intensifying the
South China Sea dispute in all of the claimant states has been
precisely that of "communities that set themselves up as essential,
mythical wholes," in the dangerous joint effort to recapture
"immanent, common essences and roots.., posited as that which has
280
been lost.
More than one state has, for example, dedicated pieces of its
national cemeteries to martyred soldiers who died defending its
claimed island territories. 2 81 These states see their defense of island
territories as directly linked with the "sacredness" of the national
territory as such.2 8 2 Most of the disputing states have also organized
highly patriotic media coverage, subsidized settlement programs, or
even "sovereignty cruises" of their claimed territories so that their
citizens can tour these far-flung corners of the notional
motherland. 283 Worryingly, unofficial political discourse in such
venues as online discussion forums, street demonstrations, or
independent publications is often equally or more characterized by
2 84
nationalist fervor than that in official media.
Of course, the establishment of a COI for the South China Sea
would not immediately replace the militarized or nationalistic
dimensions of existing discourse. But in helping to develop the basic
epistemic solidarity and corresponding (degree of) shared subjectivity
of an influential legal community of inquiry at the very heart of what
is today the region's most divisive geopolitical controversy, it would
be an important step towards deterring negative trends and
promoting at least the seeds of deeper integration. As is widely
acknowledged, East Asia's "functional integration in the economy has

279.
JANE HIDDLESTON, REINVENTING COMMUNITY: IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE
IN LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE IN FRENCH 30 (MHRA,

2005).
280.
Id.
See, e.g., The Island of Ly Son in Pictures, VIETNAMNET (Aug. 8, 2015),
281.
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/travel/138199/the-island-of-ly-son-in-pictures.html.
282.
Id.
283.
See Martin Petty, Vietnam Launches Special 'Sovereignty' Cruise,
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developed sufficiently [while t]he problem lies in the lag or deficiency
28 5
of institutional integration."
It is certain, moreover, that "[t]he main impediments to such a
move [towards institutional integration] come from non-economic
factors." 28 6 Unlike the case in Europe, where economic and political
integration have proceeded hand in hand at least to the extent of
creating shared institutions, 287 Asian economic integration via
ASEAN and other forums is exceedingly advanced, while political and
diplomatic ties lag far behind. 288 The impact of the South China Sea
dispute on the prospects for further integrating institutional
development, and vice-versa, has also been widely recognized. Indeed,
East Asian states must largely "vest . . . in East Asian regionalism
the hope of settling in a peaceful way . . . remaining territorial

disputes with neighboring countries, such as in the South China Sea,
289
and of starting a regional security framework.
There are however some dissenting opinions as to the
significance of the regional lag in institutions, with some scholars
making, for example, the "neo-functionalist" point that "policies
among states have converged and resulted in close cooperation," even
for lack of formally unified political groupings such as the European
Union or Mercosur, or a regional security framework such as
NATO. 290 Another view holds that shared cultural values and
practices, especially those rooted in Confucian traditions, serve to
bind regional powers together in a kind of generalized common
civilizational habitus. 29 1 Yet, while accurately identifying important
trends that serve to promote regional cooperation, mere policy
convergence (largely on issues of economic management) or shared
cultural background is unlikely to be sufficient in ensuring long-term
peace and stability.
This is particularly so when, politically speaking, it is still very
much the case that "an infernal tangle of alliances, frozen hostilities,
superpower tensions and historical grievances sits alongside everdeepening trade flows and shifting power plays." 29 2 With respect to
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long-running and frequently militarized and polemicized disputes
such as the South China Sea issue, in particular, economic and
cultural trends have potentially moderated but not altered the
underlying potential for dangerous confrontation. 2 93 The role of the
United States as an increasingly involved outside power, moreover,
has likely contributed to the volubility of confrontational rhetoric and
294
to the risk of a more widespread conflagration.
What, then, are the prospects that a CO might help mitigate
these dangers, stem the tides of exclusionary nationalist discourse,
and contribute to the process of building a space for mutual
recognition, the gradual development of shared Sitte or ethical life,
and further development of the institutional foundations of long term
regional peace and sociability? There are several reasons to believe
that the establishment of the COI would represent meaningful
progress towards these goals.
First, the mechanism would serve the functions noted in Part IV
of this Article, helping to transition the South China Sea dispute from
a dangerously confrontational and emotional political discourse into a
technical process of communal inquiry and transnational,
professional legal work. While this would not necessarily take the
form of a definite resolution to the issue of ultimate ownership, the
deterrence of ethno-nationalist historical narratives and promotion of
a technical idiom of judicially-determined ownership would constrain
subsequent debate within the formal conceptual categories of a
positivist juridical Weltanschauung.2 95 The progressive incorporation
of regional powers into judicial transnational legal processes would,
in turn, greatly aid in their process of state socialization into the
existing international system. Constituting both a prerequisite
sociological foundation for and potential beneficiary of this process,
the development of the legal profession has been an important
element of both state-led modernization plans and the phenomena of
burgeoning civil society throughout East Asia. 2 96 To the extent that
the further socialization of Asia-Pacific states into international
norms and governance regimes relies upon the "prospects for the
professions" within these states, 2 9 7 the establishment of a COI and
its corresponding empowerment of legal professionals would play a
valuable role in promoting this long-term socio-political trend across
the region.
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Secondly, the COI would be an important step towards giving
concrete meaning to aspirations for a more fully institutionalized
regional political and economic framework resembling that of the
European Union. The idea of an Asia-Pacific Union 298 has long been
mooted in the effort to ensure regional peace, stability, and
prosperity, 299 but movement in this direction is impeded in part
precisely by thorny politico-legal disputes, such as the South China
Sea territorial controversy. By contrast, a COI for the issue would
create a joint legal framework for the (gradual) decision of difficult
sovereignty disputes; the forum would thus operate as a (very) partial
substitute for such powerfully integrating juridical institutions as the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). 300 It is important not to
"underestimate the stabilizing effect of legal standards and
procedures-the so called acquis communautaire," which, via such

institutions as the ECJ, have "contributed to the creation of a solid
body of European law." 30 1 If far less ambitious than the ECJ, the COI
would nonetheless necessarily take as its basic premise the possibility
of gradually developing a parallel "Asian acquis," or "body of Asia3 02
Pacific law."
Finally, even failing progress towards subsequent supranational
institution building, the mechanism's geopolitical focus and scope of
membership would nonetheless make it a de facto contribution to
ongoing processes of regional bloc formation occurring in different
areas throughout the world that have been seen as promoting the
spread of universal values of individual rights and autonomy. Some
international theorists even argue that "[t]he future lies with new
forms of political and social order that take us below and beyond the
sovereign nation state, to regional and global blocs regulated by a
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(Woosik Moon & Bernadette Andreosso-O'Callaghan eds., 2005).
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INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND ASIA COMPARED 197, 204, 207 (Woosik Moon & Bernadette
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30 3
cosmopolitan legal system based on individual human rights."
Certainly, the communitarian vision of autonomous ethno-national
(or linguistic) 30 4 communities remains extremely influential in the
Asia-Pacific region, both as a normative ideal and a political reality.
Yet the continued presence of strong community affiliations does not
in itself preclude progress in a cosmopolitan process of cooperation
and integration. Indeed, as the European example serves to indicate,
it is entirely possible to view even today's furthest developed
integrationist experiments as "a complex mixture of the subnational,

national,

and

supranational

.

.

.

characterized

by

numerous

subsystems each governed by its own rules and practices." 30 5 The
further development of an epistemic and technically autonomousand increasingly transnational-legal community would thus at
minimum serve to promote the "rules and practices" of modern
legalized statecraft and international relations, contributing to
mutual recognition, interstate engagement, and common discursive
resources for cooperative political settlements.
In the final analysis, the capacity for states in the region to
develop lasting patterns of cooperative behavior and to engage in
"liberal" regional ordering projects may depend upon the degree to
which those states have been able to assert their own autonomy in a
30 6
common legal idiom that binds them as a community of equals,
even while dividing them 30 7 as formal holders of rights "good against
the world." 308 The establishment of states as formally equal
sovereigns prone to recognizing each other's rights under
international law occurred in the North Atlantic world over the
course of centuries. The principle of widely recognized formal legal
equality between autonomous states in East and Southeast Asia, on

303.
Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Building the Union: The Nature of
Sovereignty in the Political Architecture of Europe, in CONSTRUCTING LEGAL SYSTEMS:
"EUROPEAN UNION" IN LEGAL THEORY 91 (Neil MacCormick ed., 1997).
304.
See generally id.
305.
Id. at 92.
306.
For further reading on the intellectual origins and continued relevance of
the international legal principle of sovereign equality, see generally ROBERT A. KLEIN,
SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1974); JEAN L. COHEN,
SOVEREIGNTY:
RETHINKING
LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY AND
GLOBALIZATION AND

CONSTITUTIONALISM (2012).
307.
As Jean-Luc Nancy writes, 'Torigine est le trac6 des bords sur lesquels, ou
le long desquels s'exposent les 6tres singuliers" ["the origin is the tracing of boundaries
upon which, or along which, individual entities reveal themselves"]. JEAN-Luc NANCY,
LA COMMUNAUTt D9SOEUVR]E, 83 (Christian Bourgois, 2011).
308.
On the "good against the world" quality of in rem rights in Roman law, see
ALAN RYAN, ON POLITICS: A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM HERODOTUS TO

THE PRESENT 209 (2012); cf. Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, The Role of Property
Rights in Chinese Economic Transition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS 238-39 (David Kennedy & Joseph Stiglitz eds., 2013). On the role of
Roman law in establishing modern political conceptions of state (and then individual)
legal autonomy and rights-bearing status, see HEGEL, supranote 253.
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the other hand, dates at earliest to the 1960s. Bolstering the principle
of sovereign equality through the creation of a voluntary COI, and
using this forum to definitively turn the page on the asymmetrical
(inegalitarian) colonial concept of "discovery" in relation to a major
interstate dispute, could ultimately help to promote the
Enlightenment principle of "egalitarian universalism" 309 more
generally in the intellectual, political, and diplomatic cultures of
regional states.

VI. CONCLUSION

Can jointly asking questions form the basis of a lasting
community? Though this Article has not argued that it is sufficient to
do so, its necessity appears to be a much stronger proposition. In the
context of the ever-deepening transnational intercourse that binds
together specific regional communities, seemingly un-decidable legal
aporiae are quite frequently encountered. 3 10 Yet in the construction
of communities, "the aporia is not a paralyzing structure, something
that simply blocks the way with a simple negative effect"; rather,
"[t]he aporia is the experience of responsibility." 3 1 1 To accept that
different states may reasonably advance profoundly different
understandings of international legal obligation-on one side focusing
on the equality of Westphalian sovereigns and on the other side
focusing on states' capacity to generate new binding norms-is to
3 12
enter the space of responsibility for reconciliation of these values.
As Reinhart Koselleck has pointed out, the basic "methodological
aporia" of all historical inquiry is that particular events are
inherently distinct from, but can only be understood in terms derived

Cohen, supra note 158.
309.
310.
See, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 66 (1989) (identifying inconsistent
premises in the very normative foundations of international law, both to bind state
behavior and to claim the consent of all states so bound, and arguing that particular
international legal disputes are similarly aporic). But see Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative
Normativity in International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 305, 338 (1993) ("Where ...
contentions are contradictory they might paralyse each other. But even this result need
not lead to the legal aporia so impressively described by M. Koskenniemi. Instead, it
will give rise to a struggle of rivaling legal contentions for dominance. Contrary to the
epistemological approach of M. Koskenniemi, the authority of such contentions, and
thus their strength and their capacity to assert themselves, need not be equal.").
311.
JACQUES DERRIDA, ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORGIVENESS 28 (2001)
(emphasis added).
312.
The call for a study of "comparative international law" also suggests the
need for such projects of discursive engagement. See, e.g. Boris N. Mamlyuk & Ugo
Mattei, Comparative International Law, BROOK. J. INT'L L. 36.2 (2011); Martti
Koskenniemi, The Case for Comparative International Law, FINNISH Y.B. OF INT'L L.
20, 1 (2009).
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from, larger conceptual systems. 313 While transnational disputes
tend to have a material basis in effects upon people, land, or capital,
they enter historical memory, and thus the domain of political and
legal precedent, only by means of language. The justice and
legitimacy of their outcomes, likewise, is an element of this linguistic
production. 3 14 Though no such event can thus ever be "explained" (or
justified) in its totality, the process of explanation and justification is
precisely the positive project of developing shared conceptual systems
315
and ways of "being with oneself in another."
Only by joining together to confront epistemic gaps in an open
environment of rational discourse can communities peacefully
develop new conceptions of shared subjectivity. Or, to put it another
way, "legal aporia is ineradicable and it is precisely because of this
that international law has managed to retain its importance in
modern politics." 3 16 In transnational controversies where no legal
solution (or, as here and even more problematically, no
predetermined legal process) is immediately compelling, international
law can and should fulfill its most basic role as a sphere of
rationalizing and potentially (if never truly) universal justifying
discourse, or ius gentium.3 17 It is precisely because a dispute initially
lacks an absolutely determinate legal answer that a community of
responsible parties can form around that dispute to decide upon its
further systematic juridification, for a "decision that did not go
through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it
would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a
3 18
calculable process."
Against the common realist critique that states retain the
capacity to withdraw from the forms of engagement inherent in
transnational legal processes and to reassert Westphalian sovereign
supremacy and absolute autonomy, 319 it is necessary to recall the
more comprehensive theoretical realism underlying the development
of modern international law. If the "state" is itself accurately
recognized as an artificial construct, rather than a preexisting
metaphysical res, it becomes possible to view it as in large part both

313.
See discussion in Akbar Rasulov, New Approaches to International Law:
Images of a Genealogy, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EUROPEAN
AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 168 (Josd Maria Beneyto & David Kennedy eds.,
2013).
314.
See HONNETH, supra note 251, at 39.
315.
See id. at 26.
316.
Akbar Rasulov, InternationalLaw and the PoststructuralistChallenge, 19
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 799, 799 (2006).
317.
Cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Foreign
Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 134 (2005).
318.
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "MysticalFoundationof Authority", 11
CARDOzO L. REV. 919, 963 (1990).
319.
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 217.
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3 20
constituting and constituted by its transnational self-justifications.
The form that such self-justifications take, more than the substantive

aims they pursue or results they procure, may then determine the
political self-understandings and behavioral assumptions that
animate future interactions between these magni homines or their
successors. A properly "realist" state must, then, effectively take into
account its systemic role as an intersubjective actor helping to order
32 1
the community of discourse in which it is situated.
As Vattel phrased the problem in his comments on high seas
territorial claims, "pretensions to empire are respected as long as the
nation that makes them is able to assert them by force; but they
vanish of course on the decline of her power." 3 22 The Chinese Warring
States Era Legalist philosopher Han Fei, in a related vein, wrote that
"no state is eternally powerful, and no state is eternally weak. ' 32 3 All
the more reason, then, for today's magni homines to adopt a more
realistic approach to their long-term interests, and to establish a
discourse of mutual recognition based on the principles of formal
sovereign equality and cooperative, open-ended inquiry.
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320.
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